

Naturalism's Unparalleled Invasion

In the past week, as I have gone about the business of putting this issue of ALN together, I have been reminded at virtually every turn that the issues that make up the thematic core of American literary naturalism are still center stage in our ongoing quest to understand the world. A typical day: while working on another project, I read through an article on gun culture in the United States that posits a need for concealed-carry permits because of the predator-prey dynamic in the natural order of things. Then, a graduate student walks into my office with questions about the role of determinism and free will in Flannery O'Connor's *Wise Blood*. After the student leaves, I pick up a copy of V. S. Ramachandran's *A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness* in order to fill a brief gap between meetings, and I read a case study concerning a particular physiological phenomenon that highlights the fact that human behaviors and human identity are intricately tied to physiological processes. Then later in the afternoon, I find myself reading an article on the role of the humanities in modern education that discusses, at one point, the *nature v. nurture* debate and reflects on the deterministic forces at work in modern society. Jack London would have us believe that the glass tubes dropped on China on May 1, 1976, were filled with plague-bearing mosquitoes. We know better. The tubes were filled with literary naturalism.

As always, I'd like to extend my ongoing thanks to all of the members of the author societies who send me bibliographic updates, news items, and encouragement. Once again, a tip of the cap to Steve Frye for his editorial assistance and perseverance. And, a special thanks to our Assistant Editor for this issue, Ms. Renee Boice. It is no exaggeration to say that this issue would not be in your hands right now were it not for her help. And, of course, I'd like to extend my thanks to the Department of English at the University of Memphis for its support of ALN.

Hope to see many of you in Boston for the ALA in May.

Naturally,
Eric Carl Link

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Getting Grundy with Jack London's *The Road*

Ken Brandt

When introducing undergraduates to Jack London's *The Road*, I frame our discussion by reviewing an exchange of letters between London and his Macmillan editor, George P. Brett. These letters reveal that Brett was apprehensive about potential reader backlash over London's unapologetic portrayal of his tramp experiences. His open antagonism toward middle class entitlement, his unabashed admission of criminal acts and his graphic depiction of societal violence were problematic for Brett, whose editorial preferences tended to shadow the tastes of the reading public, favoring literature that skewed toward escapism over writing that directly engaged economic and political issues. In contrast, London was undaunted by the prospects of negative reader reaction and diminished sales—in part because he anticipated that the disclosure of his youthful mischief would do more to intrigue most readers than repulse them.

Promptly after reading the manuscript of *The Road*, an uneasy Brett wrote to his prize author on February 28, 1907, conveying his misgivings about the rawly confessional and defiantly unrepentant memoir. "I am a little doubtful," he admitted to London, "about putting before you my conclusions in regard to the book publication of this material, and it is perhaps better not to do so in the first instance until I have received an answer from you to the following question."¹ Clearly concerned that London's unscrubbed self-portrayal in *The Road* might taint his image and reduce profits, Brett asks him in the same letter: "If I could put before you evidence—good, in my opinion—that the publication of the book in book form would be likely to damage the sale of your other books, would that affect the question of your wishing to publish this?" London's March 7, 1907 reply was definite: "No, if you put before me good evidence that the publication of *The Road* would be likely to damage the sale of my other books, it would not affect the question of my desire for you to go ahead and publish it. Though you have not stated your reasons, I think I apprehend them" (*Letters* 675). What he almost certainly apprehends is that Brett fears readers will

be appalled by London's *picaro* persona that revels in a life of deception, begging, and thieving in the tatty underworld of road kids and hobos. Defending his self-depiction, he explains to Brett: "In *The Road*, and in all my work, in all that I have said and written and done, I have been true. This is the character I have built up; it constitutes, I believe, my big asset. . . . I have always insisted that the cardinal literary virtue is sincerity, and I have striven to live up to this belief." Extending his explanation in this letter in even more detail, London continues: "I am willing to grant the chance that I am wholly mistaken in my reasoning. Nevertheless, I look back on my life and draw one great generalization: IT WAS MY REFUSAL TO TAKE CAUTIOUS ADVICE THAT MADE ME." He then describes how the manager of *McClure's* magazine, John S. Phillips, once advised him to "take the guts and backbone out of [his] stories." He claims, though, that he is now much better off because he did not surrender to Phillips's counsel to "enter the ranks of clever mediocrity and there to pander to the soft, fat, cowardly bourgeois instincts" (675). Although London is grateful for Brett's "solicitude," he concludes that he will in this instance likewise follow his own judgment in moving ahead with the publication of *The Road*.

In his June 17, 1907 reply, Brett attempted to further clarify his reservations about publishing *The Road*. He wrote that though he previously expressed his feeling that "it might perhaps under some circumstances be better not to publish [*The Road*] . . . I had never explained to you exactly why I wrote to you in the first instance in relation to the matter." Diplomatically, Brett conveyed his position by proxy, enclosing a letter sent to *The New York Times* "from a person of whom I had never heard and which represents my own feeling in regard to the effect that the publication of this book may have on the sale of your other books." Brett reassures London, though, that "I do not send this . . . with the least intention of asking you to revise your decision, your judgment is undoubtedly better than mine in regard to any matter connected with the publication of any of your books, but only as an excuse for my letter of the February 28th, which perhaps must have seemed to you to have been possibly ungracious and perhaps very much uncalled for." The enclosed clipping contains a disapproving response to London's tramp writings, which were being serialized in *Cosmopolitan*, in a letter from an

E. F. Allen of Redlands, California.² Titled “Jack London’s Memoirs,” the letter reads:

A man who has risen from the status of a common tramp to that of a successful novelist deserves much credit, and should be proud of his achievement. Jack London is evidently proud of his achievement, for he is now exploiting his experiences in the “underworld” in a well-known monthly magazine, (“My Life in the Underworld,” *Cosmopolitan*) but there is nothing of modesty in his pride. He glories in the facts that he lived by begging, stole rides on trains, and was skillful in eluding police. These memoirs are certainly not praiseworthy, and will, I think, detract from his literary reputation. It is deplorable that he should so far debase his art.

Even though Allen’s letter does offer a cogent example of the negative feedback Brett was afraid might snowball in response to the Macmillan’s book publication, London responded on July 11, 1907, with a civil but firm rebuttal: “Believe me, I thoroughly appreciate your point of view in the matter of the publication of my tramp experiences, and your letter did not offend me in any way.” He was, however, less appreciative of Allen’s letter: “As regards the clipping you have sent me, in which some man gratuitously attempts to order my life for me, I can only say that I received dozens of similar gratuitous letters, all of which, however, have been in praise of my series of tramp articles.” London goes on to reiterate his original position: “I am still firm in my belief that my strength lies in being candid, in being true to my self as I am to-day, and also in being true to myself as I was at six, sixteen, and twenty-six.” Sounding like the steadfast naturalist, he concludes: “Who am I, to be ashamed of what I have experienced? I have become what I am because of my past; and if I am ashamed of my past, logically I must be ashamed of what that past made me become” (*Letters* 693). Unsurprisingly, his underworld experiences did make London more compassionate toward hobos and other outcasts, and, at the same time, it amplified his recognition of the callousness born of middle class pretence.

Providing students with a brief preview of *The Road* in my introductory comments, I discuss an episode from the first chapter in which London

subverts middle class sanctity. In this scene London begs for food from a typical bourgeois woman. He confesses that he takes his “cue” when she opens her door, and what follows seems like an exhibition from a Hobo Actor’s Studio. Swiftly detecting her vulnerable sentimental underbelly, London’s performance begins: “At the first glimpse of her kindly face I took my cue. I became a sweet, innocent, unfortunate lad. I couldn’t speak. I opened my mouth and closed it again. Never in my life before had I asked any one for food. My embarrassment was painful, extreme. I was ashamed” (16-7). Confiding in the reader, he confesses, “I, who looked upon begging as a delightful whimsicality, thumbed myself over into a true son of Mrs. Grundy, burdened with all her bourgeois morality” (17). These kind of back-stage revelations recur throughout London’s memoir, and Brett surely feared that disclosures of such duplicitous behavior would do more to alienate than to comfort a significant portion of London’s readership. I link discussion of this passage and the reference to Mrs. Grundy, back to the letter from Allen—who seems to be a near-perfect embodiment of a “Mr. Grundy.” This reference offers a good opportunity to explain to students that “Mrs. Grundy,” a character from Thomas Morton’s 1798 play *Speed the Plough* (1798), represented the fussy personification of politesse for London and other naturalists, and became the byword for an excessively prudish, pious, and censorial sensibility. I ask students to keep these questions in mind as they enter into the reading: Was Brett too skittish about the reactions of the Mrs./Mr. Grundy? And conversely, are there places where London could have been more modest and less insolent?³

The review of the Brett-London correspondence also readies students to consider which passages from the memoir would have most likely run the risk of violating the reading public’s sense of propriety. For the next class, I ask each student to select three such passages for discussion. With reference to their chosen passages, I ask students to be prepared to respond to these questions: 1) Why would a mainstream audience of London’s day be prone to find these episodes offensive? 2) In these passages, how successfully does London critique the dominant values of that mainstream culture? Brief student presentations and collaborative analyses of these selected passages establish the course of our class discussion, which moves through rele-

vant episodes in *The Road* as we compare and contrast passages from different chapters. Depending on how much guidance students need, instructors can arrange the presentation and discussion of passages according to thematic strands. I specify three strands for students: 1) instances of open antagonism toward middle class entitlement, 2) examples of unabashed admissions of criminal acts, and 3) episodes of graphic depictions of societal violence.

Concerning London's antagonism toward middle class entitlement, one episode in which he is "battering" back doors for handouts frequently captures students' attention. Here London asks for some food from a large man eating a "big meat-pie." "He was prosperous," London comments, "and out of his prosperity had been bred resentment against his less fortunate brothers." Impervious to his pleas, the man correctly identifies London as the "kind" who is uninterested in honest labor and just wants some free food. "In fact I didn't want to work" (5), London admits to the reader, but he continues bluffing the man claiming he will work—he just needs a good meal first to build up his strength. The man actually offers him a job tossing bricks, which he can start the next day. London, though, claims that he needs to eat now: "If you give me something to eat, I'll be in great shape to toss those bricks" (6-7). Incensed by London's persistence, the man proclaims, "Look at me. I owe no man. I have never descended so low as to ask anyone for food. I have always earned my food. The trouble with you is that you are idle and dissolute. I can see it in your face. I have worked and been honest. I have made myself what I am. And you can do the same if you work and are honest" (7). "But if we all become like you," London snaps back, "allow me to point out there'd be nobody to throw bricks for you." This retort only further enrages the man, who pronounces London an "ungrateful whelp" (8). Though he leaves with an empty belly, London's cheeky subversion of the man's belief in an equitable meritocracy gives him something of a moral victory. The man is dominated by what London refers to in "How I became a Socialist" as "orthodox bourgeois ethics"—a credulous belief in a Horatio Alger-like formula of socioeconomic ascension through hard work, perseverance, and integrity (*War* 273). Students usually root London in this episode, so I ask them if his depiction of the meat-pie man might be a bit too stereotypical, a stock characterization of staid normalcy that is easy game for a rascally radi-

cal. London's point about surplus labor may be valid, but how effective is his critique of middle class entitlement? Is he more of an edifying trickster or more like the "ungrateful whelp" the meat-pie man suggests? To extend the discussion, the instructor can follow up these queries by asking students to explain how London's sponging is morally justifiable. To what degree is he adapting appropriately to the environmental niche of the hobo? Or, to what extent is he merely an opportunistic manipulator? A lively debate is likely to result.

In terms of his criminal activity in *The Road*, numerous episodes are available for student commentary. The "Road-Kids and Gay-Cats" chapter always seems to provoke insightful student commentary. In this chapter London describes marauding bands of road-kids who stalk, swarm, and plunder laborers, hobos, and drunks. "Watch out for [road-kids] . . . when they run in pack. Then they are wolves, and like wolves they are capable of dragging down the strongest man" (167-68). London details how his "push," or gang, overpowers and mugs a husky laborer. Later on his push assaults a drunken man as he crosses a vacant lot, and by chance they collide with another pack of "baby wolf" road-kids who are simultaneously stalking the same man. When the packs suddenly meet as they converge on the drunk, "it is the world primeval. . . . All about the drunken man rages the struggle for the possession of him. Down he goes in the thick of it, and the combat rages over the body and armor of the fallen hero. Amid cries and tears and wailings the baby wolves are dispossessed, and my pack rolls the stiff" (171-72). Curiously, even though London is part of the "push," he does not describe himself as directly participating in either of the attacks he describes so vividly. When his push mobs the laborer, for instance, London positions himself as more of an embedded observer, "They make a rush from all sides, and he lashes out and whirls. Barber kid is standing beside me. As the man whirls, Barber kid leaps forward and does the trick" (168-69). The "trick" is the "strong arm," a choke hold that subdues the man enabling the other road-kids to pile on and fleece him. His proximity to these assaults, though, connects him to a more serious, potentially murderous crime than making up a story to mooch a handout or eluding a brakeman to hop a train. Directing students' attention toward carefully defining London's degree of culpability in these attacks can create a dynamic class discussion,

and elicit astute comparisons with the crimes he commits in other chapters.

The road-kid gang attacks offer the familiar naturalistic animal-human linkage. In another scene, however, London goes so far as to place humanity *beneath* animals. This scene from the chapter "Pictures" is often singled out by students for its graphic depiction of societal violence. Visiting a camp of "American gypsies," London witnesses the "tribal chieftain" cruelly whipping two boys. When the mother tries to intervene to protect her son, the chieftain proceeds to whip her even more brutally. London wants to intervene, but outnumbered by other men in the camp, he is compelled to sit in submission and concedes that in the gypsy group "it was the law that the woman should be whipped. . . . and the law was stronger than I" (65). The experience prompts London to remark that human beings are ethically inferior to animals. We are actually sub-beasts of a distinctly inferior type: "The chief distinguishing trait between man and the other animals is that man is the only animal that maltreats the females of his kind. It is something of which no wolf nor cowardly coyote is ever guilty. It is something that even the dog," he maintains, "degenerated by domestication, will not do. The dog still retains the wild instinct in this matter, while man has lost most of his wild instincts—at least, most of the good ones" (68). Significantly, London does not confine his censure of the sub-bestial to members of the underclass. Provocatively, he indicts all his readers: "Worse pages of life than what I have described? Read the reports on child labor in the United States,—east, west, north, and south, it doesn't matter where,—and know that all of us, profit-mongers that we are, are typesetters and printers of worse pages of life than that mere page of wife-beating on the Susquehanna" (68-9). According to London, his privileged readers all participate in and are beneficiaries of a web of economic inequity and exploitation. Exploring London's argument here is bound to elicit vigorous responses from students. Some may observe that he is expressing a view in this passage similar to what today is sometimes called "liberal guilt." Although "liberal guilt" is a politically charged term and can be highly divisive, a carefully managed discussion on this topic in relation to *The Road*, can yield a rousing class discussion concerning the ethical tensions that persistently

attend the ideals of individual freedom, personal responsibility, and socioeconomic equity.

One of the joys of teaching *The Road* is that its conflicts remain relevant to important issues at the center of many of our contemporary cultural and political debates. London's wily, rebellious perspective also adds a vitality that surprises and amuses many students. In the memoir's opening sentences London conveys this characteristic resistance in announcing his refusal to recalibrate his tramp experiences from a reformed perspective: "There is a woman in the state of Nevada to whom I once lied continuously, consistently, and shamelessly, for the matter of a couple of hours. I don't want to apologize to her. Far be it from me. But I do want to explain" (1). Significantly, the rhetorical design of *The Road* functions to "explain"—without "apologizing" for—London's netherworld days. Writing in 1907 London may be wiser than he was in the early 1890s, but his sympathies, inescapably flawed as they are, remain with the dispossessed.

Notes

¹Quotations cited from Brett's correspondence are from the Jack London Collection at the Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino California.

²The chapters comprising *The Road* were serialized in *Cosmopolitan* magazine beginning in May 1907 and ending in May 1908. Allen's letter, dated June 5, 1907, indicates that he could have read, at most, only the first two chapters of the text what would be published as *The Road*.

³In my Realism and Naturalism course, previous readings also prepare students for the implications of the Mrs. Grundy reference. Particularly relevant are earlier discussions of Huck's various escapades in Twain's *Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*, the examination of the Doubleday suppression controversy involving Dreiser's *Sister Carrie*, and the analysis of Mrs. Johnson's characterization in Crane's *Maggie: A Girl of the Streets*.

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Kenneth Brandt is a Professor of Liberal Arts at The Savannah College of Art and Design, where he teaches courses in writing and American literature. He is the editor of *The Call: The Magazine of the Jack London Society* and is the co-editor, along with Jeanne Campbell Reesman, of the forthcoming volume *Approaches to Teaching the Works of Jack London* (MLA).

Blending Literary Eras and Forces: Romantic Naturalism in Critical Representative Literary Westerns of the Early 1900s

David Cremean

A few hundred words prior to the end of William Faulkner's picaresque outlaw novel *The Reivers*, Lucius Priest quotes his grandfather: "Nothing is ever forgotten. Nothing is ever lost. It's too valuable" (302). Though in a context different from that novel's, Faulkner's literature itself serves as a reminder of the grandfather's principle, not the least because, depending on how one examines Faulkner's work, he can be viewed among other things as practicing the divergent categories of Romanticism, Naturalism, and Modernism.¹ Certainly it is a useful critical commonplace to recognize that to a degree, all new literary eras—loose and overly simplistic designations that they may be—are in part forged by reactions against the main emphases of the eras immediately preceding them. Less commented on is the strong level of what I will term "residuality" of early periods in later literary periods, perhaps most strongly present in the American literary grain. Historically imported, the various literary periods tend to arrive noticeably later to the New World's shores, and in the process of their importation, the place itself and the people that place has helped create have at once begun molding their own distinctly American sub-varieties of American Romanticism, Realism, Naturalism, Modernism, Postmodernism, whatever. Ultimately, by "residuality," I am suggesting that two results in the American versions of these eras are as follow:

they maintain more of their preceding periods' elements than do other countries' versions and at the same time result in powerful tensions and collisions, ones arguably unique to American Literature. In fact, literary critics of no less reputation than Richard Ruland and Malcolm Bradbury refer to Charles W. Walcott's description of American Naturalism as "a divided stream" that, in their words, "expresses both determinist pessimism and transcendentalist optimism" (232). This description further leads to the conclusion that there is far more than either a negative or an insubstantial connection between, respectively, American Naturalism and American Romanticism.

American Naturalism, in fact, is not solely a creature of what Bradbury terms "the fascination of the new American cityscape" (9).² Focusing exclusively—or for that matter, primarily—on urban environs as settings for American Naturalism implies that it is decidedly if not wholly set in cities; to the contrary, it is also particularly noticeable in America's homegrown literature of the wide open spaces, the Westerns. In fact, in the final analysis, the literary Western mirrors Faulkner's work in being a complex mixture of literary periods including not only these two but the others that have "followed" yet were anticipated by them. My gaze here focuses on the two periods most prevalent early in the Western's history: Romanticism and Naturalism. Though in his more recent edition of the classic *The Six-Gun Mystique*—aptly but somewhat misleadingly titled *The Six-Gun Mystique Sequel*, since it is really a revision rather than a sequel—John Cawelti correctly claims "The Western is clearly an example of what [Northrop] Frye calls the mythos of romance. . . ." (47). Even in the more refined and delineated sense of "romance" employed by Frye, the link to the Romantic is relatively incomplete without acknowledging another link the Western relies upon, the one with Naturalism. The strong intermixing between the two eras can offer substantial benefit not only for anyone interested in a more informed reading of the Western, whether literary, popular, or both, but also for anyone interested in a pedagogy emphasizing the blurring of literary periods, including one that seems on the surface contradictory, the blurring of these two eras (or methods of understanding or both) of literature. In fact, the Western may well provide the single richest genre for teaching this Romantic Naturalism. Arguably leading the way among such Westerns are key nov-

els by the two best-known and most popular (and lingeringly so) early writers of literary American Westerns: Owen Wister (1860-1938) and Zane Grey (1872-1939).³

Before engaging these principles, further contextualization proves invaluable. Predating the Western but at the same time supplying it with many of the later genre's character types, motifs, themes, and much more, not only does James Fenimore Cooper's *Leatherstocking Saga* serve as an exemplar of the Western's Romantic strains, but also the five books include germs—if not elements themselves—of what later becomes Naturalism, thus anticipating it to some degree. For all of its Romantic trappings, from Noble Savages to the Sublime nature it mostly transpires in, Cooper's series unrelentingly represents Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur's ultimately mechanistic and deterministic evolution of civilization from savage to frontiersman to rural agrarian to city-dweller. Furthermore, as Cooper predicts, the indigenous savage, whether Noble or Satanic, and the frontiersmen are doomed and must give way to the coming of farms and towns and the neo-Aristocrats of birth, merit, or both that will lead them politically and economically. The stages for the soon-coming advent of a brutal and pseudoscientific Manifest Destiny and its powerful links to Naturalism's Social Darwinism are already set early-on in American literary history through a foundational structure that can be said to create a self-fulfilling prophecy by its influence.

Yet the seemingly unlikely linking of these two conceptions into Romantic Naturalism is far from unanticipated by at least one major American Naturalist. In keeping with Frank Norris, Wister and Grey fit well within Bradbury's description of the earlier author's essays *Responsibilities of the Novelist*, in which Norris "stressed that naturalism was not a mode of report but of romance, requiring scale, exaggeration, and symbolic motifs" (11). Significantly, Bradbury adds that Norris's essays in the volume perform the following:

explain naturalism less as a form of social reportage, or an entirely deterministic worldview, than as a form or modern epic, a drama of the people which encompassed "the vast, the monstrous, the tragic," reached into the unconscious parts of life ("the unplumbed depths of the human heart, and the mystery of sex"),

and into the great evolutionary cycles and systems of history, nature, and community. (16-17)

This duo of writers of literary Westerns indeed did all that and more—and did so with a vengeance. As such, like (and actually well beyond) Norris, they retain heavy layers of Romanticism in their work. In this tendency they stand more in line with Norris's (and Jack London's) naturalism than with Crane's, Garland's, or Dreiser's; unlike Garland, who though raised in the "west" increasingly looked east as he aged, like Norris (and to a greater degree London and a lesser degree Crane), they looked steadily to the American west in their best-known and most enduring writing.

From its very inception, the literary Western as a truly distinct genre contained traces of Romantic Naturalism. Owen Wister's *The Virginian* (1902), prototype of the genre, however descended as it is from Romanticized dime novels and historical accounts, relies heavily on a type of Social Darwinism. Wister, famously a close friend of fellow Harvard graduate Theodore Roosevelt (to whom he dedicated the novel), reaches into romance for his plot and overall sentiments. More important, his and his narrator's Romantic notion of the lead character as a "Knight of the Plains" clearly designates him a natural-born aristocrat—and thus a biologically determined creature—by thoroughly intertwining threads of Romantic Naturalism into the cowboy's costume. The plot of the novel itself is a Romantic Comedy. Though highly realistic in most physical details, *The Virginian* finds its nearest equivalent in knightly romances and their courtly love, however many semi- (or even pseudo-) democratic elements Wister laces it with. In "To the Reader," Wister in fact baldly states, "it is a colonial romance" (ix). As well, he there identifies the cowboy as "the horseman, the cowpuncher, the last romantic figure upon our soil" (x).

The epitome of this cowboy, the Virginian, whose true name, as in so many Westerns to follow, we never learn, stands distinct as a type of Nietzschean Overman from first sighting, as the narrator describes him: "Lounging there at ease against the wall was a slim young giant, more beautiful than pictures. . . . He had plainly come many miles from somewhere across the vast horizon. . . . But no dinginess of travel or shabbiness of attire could tar-

nish the splendor that radiated from his youth and strength" (3). Slightly later, in reference to the Virginian, the narrator makes one of his numerous telling editorial comments: "The creature that we call a *gentleman* lies deep in the hearts of thousands that are born without chance to master the outward graces of the type" (8). At once "democratic" and yet elitist—as the forthcoming narrative consistently shows—this comment draws on the Naturalism inherent in the heredity of the gifted. Wister need no longer appeal to the divine right of kings; rather, he has the "scientific" backing of Social Darwinism. Those preordained by biology will rise to the top, naturally, as the figure of the Virginian so steadily does throughout the novel. Even his nickname itself, the only name he usually goes by, suggests that connection, with Virginia (and the south in general) being the center of aristocratic planters and their ilk. This link becomes amplified in that the doomed Steve, introduced to the novel as a friend of the Virginian before later devolving into a rustler and being captured and hung under the vigilante "justice" of his former friend and others, calls the Virginian "Jeff" in his farewell note. "Steve used to call me Jeff . . . because I was southern, I reckon. Nobody else ever did" (264), the Virginian informs the narrator. With its double-link to both Thomas Jefferson and Jefferson Davis, even this other, pedestrian-sounding nickname furthers his aristocratic connections.

Further critical to and establishing another central trait of the Western is the Naturalistic "reality" that even the best woman is beneath man in evolutionary terms. Near the novel's end, the heroine, Molly Wood, comes to a critical recognition: "She knew her cow-boy lover, with all that he lacked, to be more than ever she could be, with all that she had. He was her worshipper still, but her master, too" (281). Yet another aspect of the biological order, the subservient nature of the literate and educated Molly (who teaches the Virginian to read and write while he convalesces from being wounded by Indians), will be reflected in female lead after female lead in Westerns both in print and on film.

Yet ever-determined to retain at least the appearance of a good democrat, Wister takes care to write the following in another essayistic aside ostensibly spoken by the novel's narrator: "All America is divided into two classes,—the quality and the equality. The latter will always recognize the former when mistaken for it. . . . [T]rue democracy and

true aristocracy are one and the same thing" (91). This forced equation also suggests a "natural aristocracy," one present from birth, undeniable and obvious, and one that of necessity must rise, must triumph. It designates determined nature over nurture, a variation on "survival of the fittest," however thoroughly Wister attempts to hide it as democratic in his logic: "every man thenceforth should have equal liberty to find his own level" (91). It is all natural—and therefore foreordained and just. Competition is a key to life, winning to success: in the naturalistically-tinged world of *The Virginian*, the main villain of the story, Trampas, is as predestined to lose at gunplay to the Virginian as the mocked missionary, Dr. MacBride, believes his Calvinism has pre-damned the non-elect. Interestingly, MacBride pompously deplores the tall-tale competition among the cowboys as lying. When Mr. Ogden attempts to explain the matter in the naturalistic parlance of the times (one should note its equivalence to the deterministic forces of the free market and to Darwinistic ideas)—"It's the competition, don't you see? The trial of strength by no matter what test"—MacBride nonetheless speaks more truly and clairvoyantly than he knows, pontificating, "in the end we have the spectacle of a struggle between men where lying decides the survival of the fittest. Better, far better, if it was to come, that they had shot honest bullets" (142). The Virginian, the natural aristocrat, not only won the tall-tale contest, but also, as the best naturally equipped man, will win the inevitable shootout with Trampas. The narrator, the cowboys, the Virginian, and the others may reject MacBride's theological determinism, but "scientific" varieties providing essentially the same deterministic outcome constitute their foundational truth.

Wister leads in direct descent to Zane Grey. Grey's penchant for the healing "vigorous life" espoused by Teddy Roosevelt was, ironically enough, followed to a degree by Wister, whom Grey resented because he "beat" Grey both in writing the first great literary Western and in being Roosevelt's close friend. This signature Rooseveltian concept places Grey within an environmentally-nurtured determinism littered with traces of Social Darwinism. Despite his self-imposed rivalry with Wister, which really proved no rivalry at all from Wister's end, according to Grey biographer Stephen J. May, Grey "systematically digested Wister's novel, studying how its author blended narrative, dialogue, and

description. Grey loved *The Virginian* and wanted to write a book similar to it" (23). More consistently and yet in a more convoluted manner than Wister, Grey joins Norris as an author of Romantic Naturalism. Norris in fact maintains that naturalism is "a form of Romanticism" dealing with, as noted above but worth repeating here, "the vast, the monstrous, the tragic" (qtd. in Ruland and Bradbury 230). This terminology directly implies the Gothic, and while Wister's writing is more or less devoid of it, Grey practices two of Norris's three elements, almost always omitting the tragic. As well, Gray combines his Gothicism with other elements of Romanticism and Naturalism.

Representative of Grey's work as a whole are his most famous novel, *Riders of the Purple Sage* (1912) and its somewhat discordant and contradictory sequel *The Rainbow Trail* (1915), both of which offer the same vast, towering landscape (around and in the Monument Valley area made most famous by John Ford⁴), several of the same characters, and Mormon villains. Two other representative Grey novels also numbered among his best are *Wanderer of the Wasteland* (1923) and *The Vanishing American* (1925). On one level, the plotting of each is the stuff of melodrama. Grey notes in his brief Foreword to *Rainbow Trail* that it is a "romance"—a designation he frequently claims in numerous other venues. In fact, as Stephen J. May argues in his Preface to *Zane Grey: Romancing the West*, "Grey was firstly a writer of romances and secondly a writer of westerns" (xv). "I could never write realism," Grey admitted (qtd. in Pauly 175). Similarly, he confessed that "Realism is death to me. I cannot stand life as it is" (May 22). Consequently, almost certainly bipolar as he comes across in May and Pauly throughout, he was constitutionally unable to use a Realistic Naturalism and tended toward a Romantic Naturalism instead.

Consequently, further undergirding Grey's Romanticism is the fact that he "was a nineteenth-century writer trapped in the twentieth century," as May phrases it. "He fed upon Wordsworth and the romantic poets' worship of nature . . ." (xv). The earlier *Riders of the Purple Sage* and *Rainbow Trail* are more or less completely in the Romantic vein, with but thin traces of Naturalism. In *Riders*, for instance, the Mormons seem explicable to Grey only through a type of determinism: at one point the Mormon Jane Withersteen proclaims the Mormon

men, like the Mosaic Pharaoh, "have been driven, hated, scourged till their hearts have hardened" by the U.S. government (12), a force of their environment; at another point, Jane's bishop reminds her that "no born Mormon ever left us yet" (141), denoting a hereditary determinism while connoting a possible or even likely environmental component. Even Wister's conception of noble southern blood and thus telling heredity makes an appearance when Bess is being informed about her true, gentile family: her uncle, Lassiter tells her that her father was "as fine an' gallant a Southern gentleman as I ever seen. Frank come of an old family. You come of the best of blood, lass, an' blood tells" (284). One of the few other Naturalistic elements in the novel connects to the Western as a whole, involving as it does a statement about how guns have become a socially conditioned fact of life in the region: "Gun-packin' in the West since the Civil War has growed into a kind of moral law. An' out here on this border it's the difference between a man an' somethin' not a man" (147). Both nature and nurture tell.

In Wister's tradition, many, though far from all, of Grey's characters also stand larger than life—at least at the opening of his books, that is. By novels' endings, his lead characters attain that level if they did not begin there. Like Wister's *Virginian* (and Brand's own protagonists), his heroes tend to be or at least strike others as physically impressive or having the potential to be so, in essence destined if not dressed for success. Lassiter in *Riders* is one notable example. Although many of Grey's heroes are sick of body, mind, or spirit—or all three—and therefore in need of healing and teaching that only the land itself can impart on them, they always have an inherent capability that causes them to rise, naturally, under such influence. May is not overstating the case in claiming ". . . Grey championed the role of the frontier in shaping and defining the ideal American character" (xv). "Shaping" is of course a key term here, describing as it does the environment's impact on humankind. For Shefford in *Rainbow Trail*, Adam Larey in *Wanderer*, and a host of Grey heroes, such is the case, and as a result, Nature takes a capital "N" and is determinant even as it provides a Romantic healing. These men and women simply need the environment and occurrences to shape them, or, as Grey frequently expresses it via one of his favorite images, they require a crucible, usually one of the dry desert heat.

This image is perhaps originally noticeable in *The Rainbow Trail* (first published in serial magazine form, and recently again in a reissue reincorporating more of Grey's material, and originally entitled *The Desert Crucible*), featuring Shefford. But its Naturalistic presence is even more visible in *Wanderer of the Wasteland*, likely Grey's ultimate novel employing Romantic Naturalism, in Larey.

Still a romance and otherwise in keeping with the Romantic vein—it employs the happy ending of a comedy—Darwinian lines ring throughout it, coupled with Grey's idea of the desert as crucible. As one example of the former, Adam says to himself “Survival of the fittest” (15); as another, the narrator sermonizes, “Nature in the desert did not teach men to meet a threat with forgiveness. . . . Instinct had preference over intelligence and humanity” (149); in yet another, the narrator observes a lesson Adam has learned: “How cruel nature was to the individual—how devoted to the species!” (127). As for the crucible, the old desert rat Dismukes advises Adam, “Let every man save his own life—find his own soul. That's the unwritten law of the wastelands of the world” (89). Indeed, most of the novel focuses on Adam Larey's crucible experiences and a mystical lesson he learns relative to the unity of nature's seeming cruelty and determinism, God, and the freedom of the individual. Ultimately it is the sense of a nature that is not merely beneficent, but ultimately so. The crucible provides a central image for Grey's Romantic Naturalism as perhaps *the* unifying principle for him of both the world he longed for and the world he lived in.

So as May points out in linking Grey to Naturalism, he “succumbed to the current thinking on Social Darwinism mixed with a strong secular Calvinism” (13). He also may be readily linked to Norris in the following pseudo-scientific, quasi-personal religious sense: “apart from its political, muckraking side, Norris's work activates the American sense that great and noble powers work in the universe, powers that sometimes have a malign face but a grand indifference which finally works for human destiny” (Bradbury 20). This very concept links to Grey's penchant for finding God in nature and his entire idea of the crucible: in essence, the desert's acting on men is an unknowable but sensed God testing and refining and remolding them. Several critics have commented that the landscapes in Grey's novels are actually characters in them. This is not the case—unless one sees Grey's God as

somehow personal. For that is what the landscape and all of Nature is to Grey in his pantheistic-Calvinistic mysticism. As such, it further unifies the Romantic and the Naturalistic.

The darker side of Grey's Romantic Naturalism, however, is primarily another Naturalistic one, which often includes a dose of the Romantic as well: racial considerations. May notes regarding *Riders*:

He [Grey] believed that the whites in the region, having learned “the heritage of the desert,” personified “the highest evolutionary form of humanity.” Because the Indians shared this sacred territory they were in fact superior to whites who lived elsewhere. But since the Indians had lost the region through warfare, they were inferior to their victors: the Mormons scattered throughout the Arizona Strip. This was . . . a simplistic but straightforward version of Darwinism. (67)

This racial “vision”—or similar versions of it—was of course a powerful presence of the time. His prejudices appear throughout his writing. “Greaser” is a common term in his lexicon, and “nigger” is used frequently, though mostly by characters.

But most of his attention in terms of race and minority groups turns to Indians, where the “red man” is prophesied to be about to disappear. The title *The Vanishing American* refers to this very idea. The Navajo Nas Ta Bega of *The Rainbow Trail* voices this inevitability to Shefford: “The Indian and the white man cannot mix. The Indian brave learns the habits of the white man, acquires his diseases, and has not the mind nor the body to withstand them. . . . It is the sunset of the Navajo. . . . the Navajo is dying—dying—dying” (158). Nophaie, the central male figure in *The Vanishing American*, echoes these words and sounds a great deal like Chingachgook himself when proclaiming “The Indians' deeds are done. His glory and dream are gone. His sun has set. Those of him who survive the disease and drink and poverty forced upon him must inevitably be absorbed by the race that has destroyed him. Red blood into white! It means the white race will gain and the Indian vanish” (294). It is no matter that just a scant few pages earlier Nophaie himself had proposed much the same as a major part of the answer to what he himself terms “the Indian problem”: “Let him move among white

men and work with and for them. Let the Indians marry white women and the Indian girls marry white men. It would make for a more virile race” (266). The eugenic overtones of the final sentence may have been consonant with the times, but they smack of “ethnic cleansing” and deadly scientism now, ninety-five years after they were published and seventy years after Auschwitz. Along this same vein, the deaths of the female Indians Glen Naspa in *Rainbow Trail* and of Gekin Yashi in *The Vanishing American* seem to signify further the Indians’ coming extinction since those who bear life themselves are vanishing among the tribes.

Grey’s Indians are therefore tragic, in the tradition of Cooper’s Noble Savages, Uncas, slain much too young, and Chingachgook, who becomes an alcoholic. Grey’s own vision of the Indians is itself based on racist constructions: it is the overly positive stereotype of “The Noble Savage,” replete with its inbuilt infantilization: in *The Vanishing American*, Mrs. Withers instructs Marian Warner about the fact that Indians “are children of nature. They have noble hearts and beautiful minds. . . . They are as simple as little children” (38). Grey makes Nophaie himself, kidnapped as a youth and educated through college in the east, a divided man who thinks to himself about his people’s “thousand other manifestations of ignorance as compared with the evolutionary progress of the white man. Indians were merely closer to the original animal progenitor of human beings” (114). Clearly, few constructs entwined Romanticism and Naturalism more inseparably together than the Noble Savage.

Finally, it would be remiss regarding the literary Western not to note slightly more concerning the next historical literary period, Modernism, about which Malcolm Bradbury maintains, “Earlier naturalism had been largely raw, accumulative, denotative, driven by a deterministic picture of individual lives. Earlier modernism had often shown the individual as a discrete consciousness and had sought form and insight outside history” (167). Though not part of my main focus here, Wister and Grey both move toward Bradbury’s second sentence through employing characters who possess “a discrete consciousness” and whose writings still provide, eighty-five to one hundred and ten years following their publication, “insight outside of history.” As such, they reflect neither merely the territory behind nor the territory of their present times, but they also

anticipate the territory ahead.

In the end, the literary Western’s penchant for Romantic Naturalism was neither exclusive to literature nor to its earlier time periods. Varying works of art by Bierstadt, Remington, Charles Russell, and others include elements of this same phenomenon. This combination of eras most typically considered separately also served well in many of the best Western films, including those directed by talents ranging from John Ford, Howard Hawks, and Anthony Mann on through the Spaghetti Westerns of Sergio Leone and on into the American Westerns of Sam Peckinpah, Clint Eastwood, and any number of fairly recent directors of Westerns. As for literary manifestations, Romantic Naturalism is evident in the Westerns of Elmore Leonard and Robert B. Parker on through those of Larry McMurtry and Cormac McCarthy. The tensions this union creates may be uneasy ones, but they are tensions pregnant with meanings and possibilities—and thus there for the teaching.

Notes

¹ To emphasize the singularity and importance of the literary periods and the genres, I am following the practice of using capital letters for them except, of course, in quotations unless the source itself employs them.

² Rather than considering Realism and Naturalism as two distinct “eras,” I am following the common practice of collapsing the two together under “Naturalism” in agreeing with Bradbury that “Naturalism was realism . . . scientized” (9). It should be stressed, however, that in pushing the two “eras” together, the main emphasis I am making in my argument involves Romanticism and major elements of Naturalism at least commonly not viewed as having much to do with “Realism.”

³ My original intent for this essay involved including a discussion of Max Brand’s strange and fascinating four book “Dan Barry Series,” but space considerations given the limited scope of this project have caused me to excise it. For the time being, then, I will simply note that discussing that series—comprised of *The Untamed* (1919), *The Night Horseman* (1920), *The Seventh Man* (1921), and *Dan Barry’s Daughter* (1923)—deserves a treatment all its own involving Romantic Naturalism. To sizable elements of a Poeish, Charles Brockden Brownesque Romanticism and Darwinistic and en-

vironmental determinism, it adds an even wilder Romanticism and reams of Freudian and Jungian psychological and even mythical determinism.

⁴Grey was the first person to push filmmaking in Monument Valley (Pauly 4). The film version of *The Vanishing American* (released in 1925, like the novel) was the initial Western shot there (Pauly 216-17), predating John Ford's star- and icon-making vehicle for both John Wayne and Monument Valley, *Stagecoach* (1939), as it did by fourteen years.

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David Cremean is Associate Professor of Humanities at Black Hills State University in Spearfish, SD. Past President of the Western Literature Association (2009), he has published roughly 30 book reviews and articles on Hemingway, Cormac McCarthy, and Clint Eastwood, as well as introductions for Zane Grey's *Rainbow Trail* and Max Brand's *The Seventh Man*. He also has had a number of creative works published

Five on Twelve

*For each issue of ALN the editors ask someone in the field to share his or her favorite books. We aren't sure why we do this. Call it either a strange obsession or the idle wandering of curious minds. For this issue of ALN, we asked **Roark Mulligan**, associate professor at Christopher Newport University in Virginia and editor of Dreiser's *The Financier*, the latest volume of the ongoing Dreiser Edition being published by the University of Illinois Press.*

The Mulligan Top Five

1. Theodore Dreiser *An American Tragedy*
2. William Faulkner *The Sound and the Fury*
3. Thomas Pynchon *Vineland*
4. Philip K. Dick *The Man in the High Castle*
5. Either Kenneth Burke *Towards a Better Life* or Frank Norris *McTeague* ("An obvious tie by any objective standards"—Roark Mulligan)

*The editors wish to thank Professor Mulligan for his list. We have studied Professor Mulligan's list at great length, attempting to determine if there are any common denominators among them that would give us some insight into the mind of the man who produced a standard edition of *The Financier*. At first, we could discern few trends (although we were very pleased to see *The Man in the High Castle* on the list...bravo!) Then, it occurred to us that the key must rest in Burke's *Towards a Better Life*. After all, how many people even know Burke wrote a single novel, let alone put it on a "top five" list? If you said "nobody," we think you are getting close to the truth. It must be a code, we believe—some ironic commentary on the "rhetorical" features of American culture and modern relationships. What is Mulligan saying to us? What is his grammar of motives? *Towards a better life?* Nay, *Mulligan says to us, towards a better America. Cowperwood would be proud...in his jail cell...**

Ten Questions with John Dudley



John Dudley, Associate Professor of English at the University of South Dakota, is the author of *A Man's Game: Masculinity and the Anti-Aesthetics of American Literary Naturalism* (University of Alabama Press, 2004). He is currently

working on a study of African-American literature and culture between 1890 and 1928, with an emphasis on the role of music, aesthetics, and material culture in developing notions of racial identity.

ALN: Much of your work seems to revolve around issues of naturalism, gender, ethnicity, and even elements of popular and folk culture. How did you first get started working on these issues, and what attracted you to the questions these issues raise for the literary scholar?

As an undergraduate reading Crane, Norris, Dreiser, and Wharton for the first time, I was drawn to their attempts to explain such difficult questions, even if these attempts didn't always seem completely successful. After I learned more about these writers and their times, I saw that they articulated many of the same concerns about free will, technology, identity, etc., that we're still sorting out a hundred years later. Of course, Americans are not unique in facing challenging issues of race and gender, but the particular dynamics of these issues in American culture are certainly worth exploring, and these writers provided some remarkably rich texts through which to do so.

ALN: Your book, *A Man's Game: Masculinity and the Anti-Aesthetics of American Literary Naturalism* is one of the more recent major studies of American literary naturalism. What was the genesis of this project?

Not surprisingly, that book started out as a dissertation, and I began with a couple of fairly simple (maybe even simplistic) questions: why were the preeminent American writers of the 1890's so different from, and even hostile to, the turn toward aestheticism among their British counterparts? And,

why did aesthetic or artistic arguments of this era seem so obsessed with questions of gender, and of masculinity, in particular? These questions really arose out of my time, many years earlier, as a research assistant for an art historian, during which I read quite a bit about Walter Pater, and his connections to Oscar Wilde and literary aestheticism. Much later, when I learned about Frank Norris's experiences as a painter and his brief flirtation with aestheticism, it suggested that the battle lines between the social engagement of naturalism and the principle of "art for art's sake" were more complicated than I had imagined. Even though the project ended up taking me in some unexpected directions, the experience taught me a lot about the value of having some honest questions as the basis for research.

ALN: From your vantage point, what are the major ideas you would like scholars and students to take away from your book?

I suppose the main point I was hoping to make is that naturalist authors are saying something about the nature of art when they talk about gender. Certainly, readers have long noticed the profound interest in questions of manhood and masculinity in writers like Crane, Norris, and London. While it might be true enough to say that their work reflects the gender politics of that era, I think it also uses the language of gender to establish an aesthetic—or really, anti-aesthetic—sensibility that links it with the work of other writers, such as Wharton, Chopin, Chesnut, or Dunbar, whose relationship to the dominant ideologies surrounding masculinity might be rather different. Underlying this argument is the assumption that naturalism exists as a distinct category of literature, and that it means something more than either a philosophy of "pessimistic determinism" or a simple reflection of Social Darwinism. Like most things, naturalism is more complicated than it might seem, and I think there's still a critical tendency to dismiss or oversimplify it, even among those of us who appreciate the importance of these writers—or who just enjoy reading the books!

ALN: Your current book project deals with ethnic issues in naturalism, specifically the absent consideration of African-American authors. What can you tell us about this project?

It seems to me that there hasn't been nearly enough interaction between the criticism on literary naturalism and that focusing primarily on African-American writers of the early twentieth century. Partly because I teach courses in both areas, I've wondered about the role of writers like Charles Chesnutt or W. E. B. Du Bois, and their adoption of naturalism. The question of influence works both ways, I think. I'm interested not only in how they adapted naturalist techniques or ideas, but also how their work helped shape what we define as naturalism through the twentieth century and beyond. Much recent criticism has dealt with questions of race and ethnicity in canonical naturalist texts, and I think it's worth considering how black authors did more than simply "respond" to the racial views that we find in works by Norris, London, and others. Instead, I think they construct a fascinating concept of racial identity that is both representative of that historical period and important for understanding the various nature/culture debates that continue to this day. I'm also interested in the emergence of jazz and blues in this period, and this project will look at the ways in which performance and technology intersect with questions of the "natural" in African-American music and literature.

ALN: Given the marginal status of African-American writers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, what are some of the key questions scholars need to answer regarding this issue?

So many challenges faced African-Americans during that era, and yet there's this explosion of writers and artists that emerged during this time. One assumption that scholars have begun to question is an understanding of this as a transitional period leading up to the "Harlem Renaissance"—arguably, what's been referred to as the "New Negro Renaissance" began at least as early as the 1890s. How the African-American writers of this time contributed to the ongoing American literary and cultural tradition is something critics are still beginning to explore. We often wrestle with the problem of definition when it comes to literary naturalism as a genre, but I also think it's worth considering what the particular qualities of African-American naturalism might be. It's easy to see, for instance, how a book like Paul Laurence Dunbar's *The Sport of the Gods* exemplifies certain characteristics of naturalism.

After all, the title kind of gives it away! But, what issues, problems, or ideas in the novel reflect the unique history, culture, or aesthetics of the African-American tradition, and what does this do to our understanding of questions of nature, determinism, free will, and so on? In other words, adding this book to our naturalist "canon" is good for a lot of reasons, including how it enriches our knowledge of what naturalism itself is.

ALN: If you could assemble a list of African-American writers who could be classified as literary naturalists, who (and what works) would be on that list?

In addition to *The Sport of the Gods*, I'd certainly add Chesnutt's *The Marrow of Tradition*, James Weldon Johnson's *The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man*, and some of Du Bois's fiction, especially his 1911 novel *The Quest of the Silver Fleece*. I'd also include the work of Pauline Hopkins and Sutton Griggs, both of whom wrote for an almost exclusively black audience. I've taught Hopkins's *Contending Forces* and Griggs's *Imperium in Imperio* in courses on naturalism, and these books really help challenge some of our assumptions about African-American writers from this period. They are stylistically and ideologically hard to pin down, but are both focused on those things that Zola identified as the central concerns of naturalism: heredity, environment, and chance. Among later writers, I think Nella Larsen's *Quicksand* can be productively read within the context of naturalism. Of course much of Richard Wright's work is recognized as naturalism, but some other works that don't necessarily receive as much attention are Ann Petry's *The Street*, Chester Himes's *If He Hollers Let Him Go*, and Gloria Naylor's *The Women of Brewster Place*. I haven't taught a course specifically on African-American naturalism yet, but it looks like I've got a syllabus underway.

ALN: Especially considering your interest in gender and ethnicity, do you imagine literary naturalism as a peculiarly "modern" school of fiction? Can issues of modernity help scholars understand the evolution of literary naturalism from the 1890's through the twentieth century?

I can't imagine how literary naturalism could be anything other than modern, given the resonance of

its central concerns over the past hundred-plus years. Unlike other “isms” it seems to me that naturalism is much more concerned with asking questions than with providing firm answers, either in terms of literary technique or underlying philosophy. Maybe this works against its coherence or cohesiveness, but it also means that it never goes away. One example might be the scene, near the end of *Sister Carrie*, when Hurstwood confronts the life-size lithograph of Carrie—Dreiser’s observations about the “celebrity culture” of his day and the sense of unreality and alienation it produces don’t seem to have lost their relevance. The specific mechanisms that help determine our lives may have changed since then, but ambivalence about progress and technology and a longing for truth and authenticity are still major preoccupations today.

ALN: Do you have a favorite work of literary naturalism to teach? How do you teach that work?

I’ve already brought up *Sister Carrie*, which is always fun to discuss in class. I’m often worried that students will be too intimidated by its length or lack the patience to become involved with it (keeping in mind all the usual assumptions about the online, texting generation), but they generally have a lot to say, and, as I mentioned before, it still seems so relevant. Probably my favorite, though, is *McTeague*, which also has some dark humor, and which provides opportunities to cover so many philosophical, historical, and formal topics related to naturalism. I was lucky enough to study *McTeague* with Donald Pizer, and I’m sure I’ve borrowed a lot from him. The Norton edition includes the sensational newspaper articles about the Patrick Collins murder case, which demonstrate the ways in which a kind of debased Darwinism had spread through the culture. It also includes some excerpts from Norris’s essays on naturalism, which students can easily apply to the novel itself. Although it’s obviously a very prototypically dark story of degeneration, it’s also full of complexities and subtleties. For instance, I’m always surprised, in rereading the book, by how much of the novel deals with McTeague’s escape into a very typically “western” setting, and thinking about it in the context of the literary western opens up a whole new perspective on the story.

ALN: Are there any other projects you are working on, or do you have a sense of anything on the horizon as you move toward completion of your next book?

Speaking of westerns, I’ve also done some work—mostly conference papers so far—on Cormac McCarthy, Clint Eastwood, and the HBO series *Deadwood*, all of which might lead to another project down the road. This has arisen out of teaching several seminars on western American literature recently, and probably also my experiences over the past several years getting used to a new landscape in South Dakota.

ALN: We know that, in addition to your work as a scholar and professor, you are a musician. How did this come about? What type of music? Is this a diversion or are there ways in which your life as an artist and performer relates to your life in academia?

“Musician” might be too ambitious—let’s just say I play guitar. I love listening to jazz, but to be honest, I just don’t have the chops to play it. I’ve played in various rock bands, off and on, since college, and when I arrived here at USD, I discovered that the English Department already had a faculty band, conveniently enough. Right now, three of us, along with a drummer who teaches biology at a nearby college in Nebraska, call ourselves Narrative Feed. We play the occasional gig, and get together once a week to run through covers, from the Beatles/Rolling Stones/CCR era to more recent material (Wilco/Lucinda Williams/Ryan Adams), as well as several of our own songs. It’s primarily a diversion, something to get our minds off grading papers, writing assessment reports, and such, but it’s also a valuable creative outlet, and making music with other people, it seems to me, is especially valuable for those of us who do so much of our work in relative solitude. In order to make things sound right, you have to listen, adapt, and remain flexible. That’s a pretty good lesson for our day jobs too.

--Thanks, John!

The Pit in Italian: a Translation's Story

Luana Salvarani and
Cristiano Casalini

[Earlier this year, a new Italian translation of Frank Norris's novel *The Pit* was published by Medusa Press in Milan. The co-translators of the work—titled *Chicago in the Italian translation*—were kind enough to offer the readers of ALN some insights into the process. Much deserved congratulations go to Luana and Cristiano for making Norris's *The Pit* more accessible to readers in Italy.]

Is it possible to merge the images of Abraham Lincoln and Camillo Benso Conte di Cavour? Is it possible to translate the Chicago Board of Trade into the Piazza Affari, Milan? As a matter of fact, no. Perhaps not yet. And this is the main issue we encountered in the rewarding adventure of translating Frank Norris' *The Pit*.

The reading of American classics in their original English texts as well as their best Italian translations provided us a rich toolbox of words, sentences, nuances and stylistic solutions, but it could not help us in the real challenge of this project: to override the cultural gap between Italy and America. The feeling of fatherhood that emanates from the founders of the Nation and their myths and facts is unthinkable in Italy, and the novel is full of expressions and idioms that spring from the history of the country.

The Pit is a financial novel, focusing on the strength and epic force of capitalism as it manifested itself in late nineteenth-century American culture. Frank Norris has an astonishing ability to depict these epic forces, and to provide them with flesh and bones in realistic, sometimes unforgettable characters. However, the substantial absence of capitalistic culture in Italy makes the real flavour of Norris' prose very difficult to recreate in a translation. The technical difficulties are far easier to cope with (e.g., the *Pit* does not exist in Italy because even an exact equivalent of Board of Trade doesn't exist, and the double meaning of *Pit* as a financial term and the common meaning of *pit* is, of course, lost in translation).

The other challenge was the choice of Italian prose. In Norris' time, the leading novelist in Italy was Gabriele d'Annunzio, and we were pleased to forge some expressions in his style, as in, for instance, the rendering of the speech of the two "euphile" characters, Laura Dearborn and Sheldon Corthell. Overall, however, D'Annunzio's style could not reflect the fresh directness of Norris' prose. The language of Italian Naturalism (and *Verismo*) could not even help us to translate *The Pit*, for the society it described was rather an archaic, agricultural one, and the writers' interest focused mainly on the out-of-date and somewhat folkloric aspects of it. Likewise, language from contemporary Italian novels seemed to us too blank. So, we created a brand new language with a plain syntax but with some archaisms and old-fashioned mannerisms, particularly in dialogue. Norris' descriptions of landscapes and towns are, by chance, very detailed and almost Flaubertian in their use of *le mot juste*, so these passages were easier to translate, following respectfully every term of his lengthy lists of objects and colors. Finally, in dealing with the technical language of finance and the marketplace, we discovered we could use some of the modern terminology associated with the Italian exchange market, as well as keep the original English expressions in Norris' novel that are currently used, mostly without translation, in worldwide trade markets.

Italian newspapers and magazines have shown much interest in Frank Norris' *Chicago*, and we're looking forward to working on a new translation of *McTeague*, following Piero Gadda Conti's translation, published in the 1960s, and today nearly impossible to find in Italy. Thus far, Italian reviewers of *Chicago* have focused mainly on the sentimental aspects of the novel, and aren't always ready to taste both the "financial epic" and the vein of humor in Norris' novel. But we hope that further knowledge of Norris' work could help Italian readers to better understand the variety and vitality of American Naturalism.

Luana Salvarani (Ph.D. in Italian Studies) teaches humanities in public schools and literature at the University of Parma, Department of Education. After many critical editions of Baroque poetry, she is providing (with Cristiano Casalini) critical texts of 16th- and 17th-century classics of education (Antonio Possevino SJ, Juan Huarte, Montaigne). As a translator from French and English she works for

Edizioni Medusa (literature) and Ricordi-LIM (musicology and music criticism).

Cristiano Casalini (Ph.D. in Philosophy of Education) teaches the history of education at University of Parma. He is the author of a book on postmodernism, articles on Giovanni Gentile's philosophy of education, and a commentary on Gilson's *Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué Saint Augustin*. Now he is providing (with Luana Salvarani) critical texts of 16th- and 17th century classics of education (Antonio Possevino SJ, Juan Huarte, Montaigne). As a translator he works for Edizioni Medusa (philosophy and literature).

Dreiser Bibliography

At the 2010 ALA conference in San Francisco, a special session was held in order to unveil the newly revised and updated Dreiser Bibliography. Gary Totten and Stephen Brennan introduced the attendees to the online resource. Donald Pizer, the third member of the team who brought this project to life, could not be there, but sent a statement about the history of the project which was read to the attendees by Stephen Brennan.

The full title of the resource is Theodore Dreiser: A Primary Bibliography and Reference Guide, 3rd revised edition, compiled by Donald Pizer, Stephen C. Brennan, and Gary Totten. In this fully searchable online edition located at the University of Pennsylvania Dreiser Web Source site, errors and omissions in the two previous editions (1975 and 1991, both edited by Pizer, Richard W. Dowell, and Frederic E. Rusch), have been fixed, and coverage has been brought up through 2006. In addition, the University of Pennsylvania Library has provided the staff and expertise to completely revise and improve online use of the bibliography. It is anticipated that the bibliography will continue to be updated at its present online site approximately every two years. The editors (Pizer, Totten, and Brennan) cordially invite correspondence pertaining to errors and omissions or to post-2006 items for inclusion. The bibliography can be accessed via two addresses. The first is that of the Penn Dreiser Website, from which it can be clicked

on: "www.library.upenn.edu/collections/rbm/dreiser/". The second reaches the bibliography directly: "http://sceti.library.upenn.edu/Dreiserbib/".

*In what follows, readers of ALN will find two brief essays. First, readers will find the remarks prepared by **Donald Pizer** and read at the 2010 session at the ALA mentioned above. We would like to thank Professor Pizer for allowing us to publish his remarks here in ALN. Following the piece by Donald Pizer is a brief tour through the Dreiser Web Source at the University of Pennsylvania website. In this brief survey, **Renee Boice** gives readers unfamiliar with the website a quick tour of some of the site's features, including the Dreiser Bibliography.*

Dreiser Bibliography: A Brief Introduction

Donald Pizer

Dreiser bibliography began in the 1920s not as a scholarly interest but in response to the needs of the rare book trade for authoritative guides to Dreiser's first and rare editions. Lists and book-length bibliographies produced under this impulse were strong on such points as the varied states of an edition but gave little or no attention to Dreiser's periodical publications and to writing about him. Indeed, despite the fact that Dreiser's death in 1945 closed his career and thus offered the possibility of a full-scale bibliographical overview of his publications and of criticism about him, it was only in the early 1970s that such an enterprise got underway.

The production of a complete Dreiser primary and secondary bibliography began at that time in the usual haphazard fashion of many large-scale scholarly enterprises. As I undertook work on Dreiser in the mid-1960s, I constantly found myself confronting the difficulties inherent in my fragmentary knowledge of the full dimensions of Dreiser's writing career. About the same time, Joseph Katz, one of the major entrepreneurial spirits of this phase of American scholarly enterprise, began to publish *Proof*, a yearly publication devoted principally to American textual and bibliographical matters. Katz asked me to contribute to the 1971 first issue of *Proof*, and I did so in the form of a preliminary checklist of all of Dreiser's writing, with emphasis

on his periodical publication. I was aided immensely in this effort by the fact that in examining the Dreiser Papers at the University of Pennsylvania, and especially its correspondence files, I had always kept an eye cocked for leads on obscure publication.

Meanwhile, in another part of the forest, the *Dreiser Newsletter* (later to morph into *Dreiser Studies* and recently into *Studies in American Naturalism*) had begun publishing in 1970. Like most author newsletters, its interests were in part bibliographical, with emphasis on writing about Dreiser, and it published a yearly checklist of Dreiser scholarship, usually prepared by its editors, Richard Dowell and Fred Rusch. Also during the early 70s, G. K. Hall & Co. of Boston began an ambitious series of bibliographical reference tools in American literature. All of these threads came together about 1972 or 1973. Dowell and Rusch, both of whom taught at Indiana State University at Terre Haute, reached an agreement with G. K. Hall to do a complete Dreiser bibliography, and they proposed to me, because of my recent checklist, that I prepare the primary bibliography portion. *Theodore Dreiser: A Primary and Secondary Bibliography* was published by G. K. Hall in 516 pages in 1975.

Our attempt throughout this enterprise was to be as accurate as possible but to temper our parallel goal of completeness in relation both to practicality and to the needs of a typical Dreiser scholar. Thus, the physical description of books was rudimentary by the standards of the University of Pittsburgh descriptive bibliography series, and translations were limited to those physically present in American libraries. In a similar fashion, little foreign scholarship was cited, and annotations were pared to a brief neutrally phrased summary of contents. Our emphasis, in short, was on making the book usable as a scholarly tool by the average Dreiser scholar rather than to have it exhaustively detailed in all areas.

By the time Dowell, Rusch, and I approached G. K. Hall in the late 1980s with a plan for a revised and updated 2nd edition of the bibliography, the firm had successfully established its Reference Guide to Literature series, and we were asked to prepare the second edition in accord with the series' standard format. In addition to updating such matters as recent editions and translation of Dreiser and of scholarship bearing him, the volume was therefore now folio-sized, was printed in double columns,

and contained a subject index. And its title, on publication in 1991, was *Theodore Dreiser: A Primary Bibliography and Reference Guide*.

Some ten years later, I was approached by Michael Ryan, the Director of the Rare Book and Manuscript Library at the University of Pennsylvania, with the notion of putting the Dreiser bibliography online at the recently established Penn Dreiser site. This was an extremely attractive idea both because it was increasingly difficult to find publishers willing to undertake print bibliographies and because online publication would make it feasible to update the bibliography on a more regular basis than every ten to fifteen years. In connection with the plan for a constantly updated online bibliography, I thought it important, because Dowell, Rusch, and I were all either retired or nearing retirement, to assure continuity for the maintenance of the online bibliography down the years. To this end, I proposed to the Executive Committee of the International Dreiser Association that it should assume permanent responsibility for the appointment of a Dreiser Bibliography Committee to supervise the online bibliography. This arrangement was formalized in the spring of 2001, with the initial Bibliographical Committee consisting of myself, Fred Rusch, and Steve Brennan—Brennan in replacement of Dick Dowell, who had retired.

Penn completed putting the 1991 2nd edition online in 2003, but the bibliography in this form proved extremely difficult to operate and in effect was almost useless. Michael Ryan agreed to correct the problem by adopting a completely new method of programming the online version, but because of scheduling difficulties and turnover at Penn this second effort did not commence until the fall of 2006. The Dreiser Bibliographical Committee—with Gary Totten now having replaced the also retired Fred Rusch—then began its task of correction and updating. I was largely responsible for the primary bibliography, and Brennan and Totten for the secondary. The work went slowly because both Penn and the Committee were feeling their way within the mechanics of a fully hypertexted online bibliography, but after three and a half years it is now fully available to the public on the Penn Dreiser site.

The Dreiser Web Source: A Quick Tour

Renee Boice

Budding scholars and veterans alike have an incredible advantage within the University of Pennsylvania Dreiser Web Source at www.library.upenn.edu/collections/rbm/dreiser/. With extensive contributions by noted Dreiser scholars Clare Virginia Eby, Donald Pizer, Thomas Riggio and James L.W. West III, this resource, made possible by a grant from the Concordia Foundation, provides access to a variety of research tools and documents that make Dreiser scholarship more accessible to the contemporary student and scholar. As noted on the front page of the website, the purpose of the Dreiser Web Source is to:

...provide access to correspondence, manuscripts, notes, and photographs, 1890-1965 (bulk 1897-1955), regarding Dreiser's personal life and his careers as journalist, novelist, essayist, and political activist. In addition to these resources from the collection of the Rare Book & Manuscript Library the site includes scholarly essays and links to the International Theodore Dreiser Society and to the newly updated *Theodore Dreiser: A Primary Bibliography & Reference Guide*.

Perhaps you are sitting in front of the website right now? If so, you'll note that the design of the site is accessible for anyone with even minimal computer literacy. There are five primary headings with sub-headings. Each of the primary headings is in bold, and beneath each primary heading there are sub-headings beside bullet points. The first heading at the top left corner of the page is "Correspondence & Texts." Beneath this title you can click on the sub-headings, "Correspondence," "*Sister Carrie*," "*Jennie Gerhardt*," or "*Dreiser's Russian Diary*."

If you click on the "Correspondence" sub-heading, you will come to a list of sixty-one alphabetized names. If you'd like to narrow your search, click on the "Search" button which is located to the right side of the screen and in burgundy font. Select whether the desired correspondent is the sender or the recipient (To or From) and then use the drop-

box menu to select whichever name you are looking for. For example, when I select "From" and then use the drop-box menu to select "Robert Amick," I then scroll down and put 1910 in the first box and 1915 in the second box to specify the time period during which I want to search. This query results in links to seven letters appearing in chronological order beginning in 1910 and ending in 1912. When I click on a thumbnail that says "letter" located next to any of the dates, a photograph of the letter appears.

The kind of information available for each book under the "Correspondence and Texts" heading varies dramatically, and a great deal of Dreiser's body of work is not available at all, thus the absence of *The American Tragedy* and other important Dreiser pieces. The sub-heading *Sister Carrie* has a link to an essay titled "Cultural and Historical Contexts for *Sister Carrie*" by Clare Virginia Eby, as well as link to an essay titled "The Composition and Publication of *Sister Carrie*" by James L.W. West. Also available is a virtual exhibition by Nancy M. Shawcross titled, "*Sister Carrie*: 'A Strangely Strong Novel in a Queer Milieu.'" In addition to this secondary material, there is a link to a facsimile of the 1900 typescript, but that link does not work and leads scholars to an error message. The 1900 Doubleday and Page version (both in facsimile and searchable text) and the 1981 Pennsylvania Edition are both available, and both have a search function. For user convenience, it is possible to search both published texts at once.

As previously stated, the information available for each text under the "Correspondence and Texts" heading varies significantly. The sub-heading *Jennie Gerhardt* has no secondary material available, and is in its entirety devoted to photographs of the original hand-written manuscript. The link to Dreiser's *Russian Diary* will take you to no secondary materials, but there is a searchable full-text version of the book.

Moving down the left navigation column to the second heading, the "Essays" section includes three contextualizing pieces written by top contemporary Dreiser scholars. Thomas Riggio provides us with a succinct yet thorough biography for Dreiser. Roark Mulligan shares with us *Dreiser's Private Library* (initially published in *Dreiser Studies*) and helps readers understand the significance of books in Dreiser's life. Meanwhile, an essay by Donald

Pizer introduces us to extensive information regarding Dreiser's critical reputation from the time he began publishing until his death in 1945. An invaluable amount of contextual information is provided by these writers, and whether a "new" scholar or a "new to Dreiser" scholar, these essays are a great place to start.

Beneath the heading of "Images," we can click on the sub-headings "From the Theodore Dreiser Papers," "From the Swanberg Papers," or "Silent Film." Photographs in the "Theodore Dreiser Papers" are broken into volumes ranging from Volume 432 through Volume 449. Each volume is listed including a small summary of what it contains, such as Volume 440, which contains "Photographs of Theodore Dreiser's residences, 1871-1945." If you click on "The Swanberg Papers" you will come to a screen that is organized using Boxes instead of Volumes. Boxes 14 and 15 include, again, summaries of what is contained in each box. Categories range from "Young Theodore Dreiser and Family, including wife Jug" in Box 14 to "Oversize photographs of Thelma Cudlipp" in Box 15. Last in the sub-headings beneath the heading "Images" is a link to watch a 3:38 second film clip of "Dreiser and Harriet Bissell at Dreiser's residence Iroki, in Mt. Kisco, NY, made by Robert Elias in May 1938."

In the "Reference Sources" heading we have access to a multitude of information. First among the sub-headings is a link to the International Theodore Dreiser Society website. Second beneath the "Reference Sources" heading is a link to Theodore Dreiser's private library, exhaustively researched and recorded by Roark Mulligan. The sub-heading that follows is an incredibly helpful link for scholars: "Theodore Dreiser: A Primary Bibliography & Reference Guide." If you attended the American Literature Association Conference in San Francisco 2010, you might have caught the panel discussion regarding this extensive new resource within the University of Pennsylvania Dreiser Web Source.

In order to familiarize yourself with the setup and capabilities of the bibliography, it is helpful to first click on and peruse the "Table of Contents." Once you have accessed the "Table of Contents" there is an individual introduction for each section of the site which can be accessed by clicking on the very small paper and pencil icon located to the left of each listed resource. Important information—varying in subject matter from how asterisks have

been used to why certain omissions have been made—can be found in the introduction for each section, and it is advantageous to peruse this information prior to trying to use the site; doing so will help you navigate by explaining how the information is presented, and what information is available.

When you maneuver back to the homepage for the "Bibliography and Reference Guide," the next important link is the "Preface to the Online Edition." We read in this preface the publication history and manner in which the online version of this Bibliography and Reference Guide came to be.

Theodore Dreiser: A Primary and Secondary Bibliography, by Donald Pizer, Richard W. Dowell, and Frederic E. Rusch, was published by G.K. Hall & Company in 1975. A second revised and updated edition, titled *Theodore Dreiser: A Primary Bibliography and Reference Guide*, also by Pizer, Dowell, and Rusch, and also published by G. K. Hall, appeared in 1991. The online version of the second edition you are now consulting through the University of Pennsylvania Dreiser Website is by Donald Pizer, Stephen C. Brennan, and Gary Totten. The online version corrects some material in the second edition, but its principal revision consists of the addition of two large bodies of new material: editions and translations of Dreiser's own work since 1989 and writing about Dreiser since that date. The online edition seeks to be complete through 2006, and it is the expectation of the compilers that it will undergo further periodic updates.

The "Preface" continues by addressing the purpose of the website to "bring together in one place all that is known about primary and secondary materials concerning Dreiser" and the importance of accuracy to the contributing scholars.

The next link in the "Table of Contents" for the Bibliography is "Browse the Primary Bibliography." When you click this link, a page will appear on which you can begin searching. To the left of the page there is a box in which you will read "Select a Section to Browse." Nine categories are available in a drop-box menu. The choices are as follows: Books, Pamphlets, Leaflets and Broad-sides; Collected Editions; Contributions to Books and Pamphlets; Contributions to Periodicals; Miscellaneous

Separate Publications; Published Letters; Interviews and Speeches; Productions and Adaptations; and Library Holdings. Next to the drop-box menu are two more boxes in which you may narrow your search by indicating the years you would like to search. As a test run I selected "Contributions to Periodicals" and specified the years 1920-1925. Forty-one matches came up with complete bibliographic information for each, broken into categories by individual years.

As a sub-heading within the "Table of Contents" we can access the "Index to the Primary Bibliography." Information can be accessed from the index in three different ways: Bibliography; Author and Editor Index to the Reference Guide; or Subject Index. The Bibliography search options are broken into A-F, G-L, M-R, and S-Z. The Author and Editor Index has an alphabet across the top of the screen which allows scholars to search by selecting the first letter of the last name. The Subject Index is a long alphabetized list through which you search until coming to your subject. It is all pretty straight forward.

Back at the homepage for the "Bibliography and Reference Guide," we next click on the "Introduction to the Reference Guide" and read about the goal of scholars in compiling the reference guide. We read that:

The main goal of this Reference Guide has been to include in chronological order all scholarly works on Dreiser—bibliographical, biographical and critical—written in English, as well as reviews of his books. More selectively, news stories, editorials, letters to the editor and reviews of books about Dreiser have been included to provide a sense of his impact on his time and to demonstrate the diversity of material available.

Back at the Bibliography and Reference Guide homepage, clicking on "Browse the Reference Guide" will take you to a screen similar to the one for the primary bibliography. This time there is a box to the left in which one of seven categories can be selected. Again, beside and to the right of this box you will have two boxes in which you put the years during which you would like to narrow your search. The sections available in the drop-box menu are as follows: Writings about Theodore Dreiser;

Reviews; Articles; Essays; Books; Letters; and Interviews. After selecting one of these options, such as "Articles," one may type in the years during which you would like to conduct a search, for example 1930-1940. Any and all matches will appear on your screen in alphabetical order and documented in MLA format, and in this case we get 120 results, broken down by individual year from 1930 through 1940. Following each citation is an annotation about the work so that you can determine whether or not it is worthwhile to track it down for your scholarship.

The final two sections within the Dreiser "Primary Bibliography and Reference Guide" include an "Author and Editor Index" and a "Subject Index." On each page is an alphabet across the top of the screen. By clicking on a letter you immediately gain access to material contained in that portion of the relevant index.

Navigating back to the Dreiser Web Source homepage, one will note that the remaining buttons in the left navigation column provide information about the University of Pennsylvania library and some details about the Dreiser holdings in the library.

To have such a thorough and credible resource available online is a wonderful asset to scholars and students of Theodore Dreiser. The ease with which this website can be navigated is a bonus, and the time saved a luxury.

Naturalism News

ALN seeks to note all items of interest to scholars of American literary naturalism and related to the memberships of the Frank Norris Society, the Jack London Society, the Hamlin Garland Society, the Stephen Crane Society, the Theodore Dreiser Society, and beyond. If you have a newsworthy item, please send it to Eric Carl Link at eclink@memphis.edu and we'll be sure to take note of it in a forthcoming issue of ALN. Did someone in your society win an honor or reach an important career milestone? We want to know. Do you know of a forthcoming volume that might be of interest to the ALN readership? Tell us about it. Is there an event related to American literary naturalism that you attended (or would like us to attend in

the future)? Are there competitions, prizes, or grant opportunities that you have learned about?

•ALN•

Jack London: Photographer is now available. This is the first book to showcase the remarkable photography of one of America's best-known writers offering a new perspective through which to view London's writing. Jeanne Campbell Reesman, Sara S. Hodson, and Philip Adam. Hardcover, \$49.95 | 978-0-8203-2967-3. University of Georgia Press.

•ALN•

Inaugural lecture: Theodore Dreiser and the Idea of America

Thursday, October 28, 2010, 6:00pm
The Stripe, King Alfred Campus, University of Winchester

The University of Winchester invites you to an inaugural lecture by Jude Davies, Professor of American Literature and Culture. Refreshments will be available from 6pm and following the lecture. Please contact the Conference Office by email to conferences@winchester.ac.uk or telephone 01962 827322.

Jude Davies started lecturing at Winchester in 1992. Initially, his research focused on the ways that contemporary culture handled the varied fallout from identity politics, culminating in seminal articles for the journals *Screen* and *New Formations*, and in two books: *Gender, Sexuality and Ethnicity in Contemporary American Film* (1998; written jointly with Carol R Smith) and *Diana, A Cultural History: Gender, Race, Nation and the People's Princess* (2000). In recognition of this work he was elected to the Academy for the Social Sciences in 2006, followed by the award of the Arthur Miller Prize for the best academic article on an American Studies topic by a UK national, in 2008.

After co-editing *Issues in Americanisation and Culture* (2004) he has brought a new perspective to American literature of the twentieth century, by focusing on its political, social and cultural contexts. Davies's edition of *The Political Writings of Theodore Dreiser*, the result of several years of ar-

chival research funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the University of Winchester, the British Academy, and the Bibliographical Society of America, will be published by the University of Illinois Press in January 2011, to be followed by a monograph on Theodore Dreiser's literary and political significance.

[In all likelihood, this event will have come and gone by the time you are reading this issue of ALN. Perhaps the lecture was taped and could be made available to interested parties via podcast?—ed.]

•ALN•

Wharton Esherick and the Birth of the American Modern: Exhibition and Symposium

Exhibition: September 7, 2010 to February 13, 2011
Symposium: October 1-2, 2010

The Rare Book and Manuscript Library and the Architectural Archives at the University of Pennsylvania, in collaboration with the Wharton Esherick Museum (Paoli, PA) and Hedgerow Theatre (Rose Valley, PA), announce an exhibition and symposium on Wharton Esherick, an artist whose distinctive synthesis of art, theater, dance, and design forged an early and compelling example of American Modernism. "Wharton Esherick and the Birth of the American Modern," the first major examination of Esherick's work and artistic development in over fifty years, explores Esherick's artistic evolution during the early decades of the twentieth century, culminating in the exhibition of his work as part of the Pennsylvania Hill House at the 1940 World's Fair in New York City.

The exhibition is in two venues on the University of Pennsylvania campus:

Kamin Gallery
Van Pelt-Dietrich Library Center
3420 Walnut Street, first floor

Kroiz Gallery of the Architectural Archives
Lower Level of the Fisher Fine Arts Library
220 South 34th Street

Exhibition hours are Monday through Saturday,

10 am-5 pm.

The Kamin Gallery section of the exhibition explores the social, political, and artistic milieu of Esherick in the 1920s and 1930s and illuminates many of the institutions and relationships that made the American modernist movement possible. The Kroiz Gallery section of the exhibition explores Esherick's evolution as an artist in wood during this period. The exhibition will bring together a range of materials, from books, manuscripts, and photographs to prints, sculpture, and furniture, belonging to both the participating institutions and other collections.

The symposium is the Second Annual Anne d'Harnoncourt Symposium, in honor of the late director of the Philadelphia Museum of Art. The symposium begins on Friday evening with the keynote address, to be given by Dr. Peter Conn, the Vartan Gregorian Professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania and author, most recently, of *The American 1930s: A Literary History* (2008). Following the keynote address is the exhibition opening reception, in both galleries. On Saturday the symposium continues with papers by leading scholars from various disciplines on a range of topics raised by the exhibition. The symposium will conclude with a visit to Hedgerow Theatre for dinner and a performance of a dramatic adaptation of Theodore Dreiser's *An American Tragedy*.

For more information, please visit the exhibition and symposium website:
www.library.upenn.edu/exhibits/esherick.html

•ALN•

Jack London Society 10th Biennial Symposium

November 4-6, 2010
 Hyatt Vineyard Creek Hotel and Spa
 170 Railroad Street
 Santa Rosa, CA 95401
 (707) 284-1234

The Symposium returns to Jack London's beloved Sonoma Valley to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Society. The Hyatt Vineyard

Creek is offering a discounted room rate of \$160 double or single. Reservations should be made by calling 1-800-233-1234 before the cut-off date of October 1, 2010. Be sure to mention that you are with the Jack London Symposium. Symposium registration will be \$125, \$85 retiree, and \$50 graduate student. Events will include a picnic and tour of the Jack London Ranch on Friday afternoon and a visit to Kenwood or Benziger Winery. On Thursday, Friday, and Saturday we will hold regular sessions including panels of paper, roundtables, films, and other formats. Thursday evening we will have a cocktail reception, and on Saturday a luncheon.

The Mediterranean-style Hyatt Vineyard Creek is a five-star luxury hotel on 9 acres along the banks of Santa Rosa Creek; historic Railroad Square is 1 block away, downtown is a 3-block stroll, and Sonoma County wineries are within 6 miles. The restaurant at Hyatt Vineyard Creek Hotel & Spa spotlights fresh seafood with a country French influence. The spa offers Sonoma-inspired treatments, and the garden complex features a lap pool and a water-wall fountain. In the spacious guestrooms, beds are topped with fluffy duvets and partial canopies, and bathrooms are marble.

Symposium attendees should plan to rent cars to travel to the Jack London Ranch and wineries. On Friday, November 5, participants should meet at the Hyatt Vineyard Creek at 11:30 a.m. to caravan to the Ranch. We will first arrive at the picnic grounds just inside the gate to the right at the Jack London State Historic Park. A good place to pick up a sandwich for lunch is the deli inside the Glen Ellen Village Market just at the base of Jack London Ranch Road on Arnold Drive.

All other events will be held at the Hyatt Vineyard Creek.

•ALN•

The Cambridge History of the American Novel is in press, edited by Leonard Cassuto, Clare Eby, and Benjamin Reiss. Many of the 70-odd chapters will be of interest to fans of naturalism, including Jude Davies's "Dreiser and the City," Donna Campbell's "The Rise of Naturalism," Tom Lutz's "Cather and the Regional Imagination," Jennifer L. Fleissner's

"Wharton, Marriage, and the New Woman," David A. Zimmerman's "Novels of American Business, Industry, and Consumerism," Barbara Hochman's "Readers and Reading Groups," Cecilia Tichi's "Novels of Civic Protest," Tim Prchal's "New Americans and the Immigrant Novel," Russ Castonovo's "Imperialism, Orientalism, and Empire," Alan M. Wald's "Steinbeck and the Proletarian Novel," and Nancy Glazener's "The Novel in Postbellum Print Culture."

•ALN•

Roark Mulligan's new edition of Theodore Dreiser's *The Financier* has been published by the University of Illinois Press (2010) as part of the ongoing Dreiser Edition project. Congratulations, Roark!

•ALN•

Word has reached ALN that Terre Haute, Indiana, has selected Theodore Dreiser as the first recipient (in the Arts and Culture Category) of the Local Legends Walk of Fame. Dreiser will be receiving a sidewalk star in his honor. For more information, go to www.tribstar.com and use the search engine to look for articles on "walk of fame."

•ALN•

In Memoriam...

Andrew J. Furer passed away on 31 October 2010. A devoted teacher and scholar of American naturalism, Andrew received his B.A. from Harvard in 1983 and Ph.D. from Berkeley in 1995. His peripatetic teaching career took him to Harvard, Fordham, the University of Connecticut, and Emerson College, among other appointments. Andrew never lost his faith in the academy, his passion for excellence, or his capacity for deep friendship. A generous soul, he gave much to his friends, and to his students (who will remember his long and detailed comments and numerous one-on-one conferences). Andrew was extraordinarily well read in postbellum American literature, but his passion for Jack London, the focus of most of his scholarship, burned particularly brightly. Andrew's parents were

with him at the hospital as his long battle with cancer drew to a close. He will be sorely missed.

The Call of the Papers

The Hamlin Garland Society
2011 American Literature Association
Boston, MA
May 26th - 29th, 2011

The Hamlin Garland Society will sponsor one session at the American Literature Association's 22nd Annual Conference. Papers on all aspects of Garland's writing and related topics are welcome. Please submit proposals or papers via e-mail before 10 January 2011, to the program chair:

Roark Mulligan
 Hamlin Garland Society
 105 N Sulgrave Ct.
 Williamsburg, VA 23185
 757-810-2581
mulligan@cnu.edu

•ALN•

The Stephen Crane Society
2011 American Literature Association
Boston, MA
May 26th - 29th, 2011

The Stephen Crane Society invites papers and proposals for two panels at the American Literature Association Conference in Boston, MA, May 26-29, 2011. All topics are welcome. Presentations will be limited to 20 minutes. Please email proposals (approximately 300 words) or papers by **December 15, 2011** to Ben Fisher: bfisher@ms.metrocast.net.

•ALN•

The Frank Norris Society
2011 American Literature Association
Boston, MA
May 26th - 29th, 2011

The Frank Norris Society will sponsor two sessions at the American Literature Association Confer-

ence at the Westin Copley Place in Boston, Massachusetts, on May 26-29, 2011.

Session One: American Literary Naturalism. This session will focus on broader treatments of American literary naturalism (whether directly related to Frank Norris or not). Possible topics might include definitional studies, treatments of American literary naturalism in the context of late nineteenth-century culture and history, examinations of literary naturalism in the twentieth century, and related topics.

Session Two: Open Topic. Any aspect of Frank Norris's work or life will be considered.

Presentations will be limited to 20 minutes.

Please email abstracts or papers of no more than ten double-spaced pages by January 15, 2011, to the program chair:

Eric Carl Link
eclink@memphis.edu

•ALN•

**The Cormac McCarthy Society
2011 American Literature Association
Boston, MA
May 26th- 29th, 2011**

Cormac McCarthy Society Panels at the 2011 American Literature Association Conference

Session One: Cormac McCarthy and Spirituality. This session will focus on any aspect of the spiritual in McCarthy's work, from McCarthy's use of world religions present and past, Native American spirituality, or personal religious or mystical experiences as they are reflected in character or any other aspect of his work.

Session Two: Open Topic. Any aspect of Cormac McCarthy's work or life will be considered.

Presentations will be limited to 20 minutes.

Please email one page abstracts or papers of no more than ten double-spaced pages by January 15,

2011, to the program chair: Steven Frye, California State University, Bakersfield, sfrye@csu.edu.

•ALN•

**The Jack London Society
2011 American Literature Association
Boston, MA
May 26th- 29th, 2011**

The Jack London Society will sponsor a panel at the 2011 ALA conference.

Papers are welcome on any aspect of London's life and work.

Send one-page abstracts or completed papers to Jeanne Reesman at jeanne.reesman@utsa.edu by the proposal deadline of December 15, 2010. Include complete mailing and email information, affiliation, and paper title. Papers are to be no longer than 15 minutes, about 8-9 double-spaced 12 pt. font pages.

•ALN•

**The Theodore Dreiser Society
2011 American Literature Association
Boston, MA
May 26th-29th, 2011**

The International Theodore Dreiser Society will sponsor an open topic session at the American Literature Association Conference in Boston on May 26-29, 2011. Papers may be submitted on any topic concerning Dreiser or his work.

Presentations will be limited to 20 minutes.

Please send brief proposals (1-2 pages) by email to the program chair by 10 January 2011:

Gary Totten
Department of English, #2320
P.O. Box 6050
North Dakota State University
Fargo, ND 58108-6050
gary.totten@ndsu.edu

•ALN•

**AIZEN/Pusan National University International
Conference on Worldwide Naturalism in Literature
and Film
Pusan, South Korea
October 6-8, 2011**

The AIZEN® (Association Internationale Zola et Naturalisme) and Pusan National University (South Korea) solicit submissions for the jointly-sponsored conference "Worldwide Naturalism in Literature and Film" to be hosted by the Department of English Language Education, College of Education, and Pusan National University Film Institute, PUSAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY Pusan, South Korea, October 6-8, 2011.

We invite proposals for original papers, panels of three or four, and special sessions. Comparative and interdisciplinary approaches are welcome. Professors, scholars, instructors, and doctoral candidates from the disciplines of naturalist literature and film are encouraged to submit proposals for twenty-minute presentations. Audiovisual equipment will be available in the conference rooms.

The following are suggested topics or panel headings:

- *The Reception of Emile Zola in Asia
- *Asian Influences on French Naturalist Writers
- *Comparative Approaches to Asian Naturalist Texts
- *Special Panel: South Korean Naturalism
- *Naturalism in Asian Cinemas
- *Film Adaptations of Naturalist Novels
- *Zolian Fiction as Document/Documentary
- *Lesser-Known French Naturalists
- *Migration and Immigration in Naturalist Fiction
- *European Naturalism and Neo-naturalism
- *Naturalism in Anglo- and Francophone Canadian Literature
- *Female Naturalist Writers in America
- *Special Panels on American Naturalist Writers:
- *Theodore Dreiser, Jack London, Upton Sinclair, and Stephen Crane
- *American post-Darwinian and Neo-naturalist Fiction

NB: Most papers will be presented in English, but abstracts and papers in French will also be welcome. Please e-mail your suggestions for panels and/or abstracts with a brief resume to:

Dr. Anna Gural-Migdal, Professor, and Dr. Sang-Koo Kim, Professor Emeritus, University of Alberta Pusan National University at aguralm@ualberta.ca or kskoo@pusan.ac.kr
<http://www.ualberta.ca/~aizen/>
http://english.pusan.ac.kr/html/00_main

Deadline for proposals: January 31, 2011

Bibliographic Update

Listed below are studies on American literary naturalism published since the last bibliographic update (in the fall 2009 issue of ALN). The lists below are comprehensive, but not exhaustive, and we undoubtedly missed a work here and there. If you published an article or book related to American literary naturalism in the past year and it is not listed below, please let us know, and we will make sure to note it in the next issue of ALN.

General Studies

Freitag, Florian. "Naturalism in Its Natural Environment?: American Naturalism and the Farm Novel." *Studies in American Naturalism* 4.2 (Winter 2009): 97-118.

Müller, Kurt. "Investigating the Power of Performance: Manners and Civility in American Naturalism." *Civilizing America: Manners and Civility in American Literature and Culture*. Heidelberg, Germany: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2009. 253-273. Print.

Stephen Crane

Claviez, Thomas, "Declining the (American) Sublime: Stephen Crane's 'The Open Boat'." *Amerikastudien/American Studies* 53 (2008): 137-151. Print.

Dingledine, Don. "'It Could Have Been Any Street': Ann Petry, Stephen Crane, and the Fate of

- Naturalism." *Reading America: New Perspectives on the American Novel*. Newcastle upon Tyne, England: Cambridge Scholars, 2008. 26-46.
- Dowling, Robert M. and Pizer, Donald, "A Cold Case File Reopened: Was Crane's Maggie Murdered or a Suicide?" *American Literary Realism* 42 (2009): 36-53. Print.
- Kroes, Rob. "Faces of War: Mathew Brady, Stephen Crane, and the Civil War." *Passion de la guerre et guerre des passions dans les Etats-Unis d'Amérique*, Anne Garrait-Bourrier and Ineke Bockting, eds. Clermont-Ferrand, France. PU Blaise Pascal. 2008. 33-46. Print.
- Nothstein, Todd W. "Performance and Perspective on a Space-Lost Bulb: The Value of Impressionism in Stephen Crane's 'The Blue Hotel'." *EAPSU Online: A Journal of Critical and Creative Work* 5 (2008): 193-211. Web.
- Saunders, Judith P. "Stephen Crane: American Poetry at a Crossroads." *Teaching Nineteenth-Century American Poetry*. Paula Bernat Bennett, Karen L. Kilcup and Philipp Schweighauser, eds. New York, NY: Modern Language Association of America. 2007. 185-99. Print.
- Wood, Adam H. "'Crimson Blotches on the Pages of the Past': Histories of Violence in Stephen Crane's *The Red Badge of Courage*." *War, Literature & the Arts* 21 (2009): 38-57. Print.
- Theodore Dreiser**
- Hricko, Mary. *The Genesis of the Chicago Renaissance: Theodore Dreiser, Langston Hughes, Richard Wright, and James T. Farrell*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009. Print.
- Lemaster, Tracy. "Feminist Thing Theory in Sister Carrie." *Studies in American Naturalism* 4.1 (2009): 41-55. Print.
- Shonkwiler, Alison. "Towards a Late View of Capitalism: Dehistoricized Finance in *The Financier*." *Studies in the Novel* 41.1 (2009): 42-65. Print.
- Tischleder, Bärbel. "The Deep Surface of Lily Bart: Visual Economies and Commodity Culture in Wharton and Dreiser." *Amerikastudien/ American Studies* 54.1 (2009): 59-78. Print.
- Tsukada, Mari. "Carrie's Sexuality in the Two Editions of Sister Carrie." *Sophia English Studies* 34.(2009): 53-63. Print.
- Whaley, Annemarie Koning. *The Trouble with Dreiser: Harper and the Editing of Jennie Gerhardt*. Amherst, NY: Cambria, 2009.
- Hamlin Garland**
- Pizer, Donald. "Sexuality in Hamlin Garland's *Rose of Dutcher's Coolly*." *Papers on Language and Literature: A Journal for Scholars and Critics of Language and Literature* 45.3 (2009): 287-297. Print.
- Jack London**
- Dow, William. *Narrating Class in American Fiction*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print.
- Haley, James L. *Wolf: The Lives of Jack London*. New York, NY: Basic, 2010. Print.
- Haslam, Jason, et al. "'Morality Is a Social Fund': Jack London's Strait-Jacket Ethics." *Bausteine Zu Einer Ethik Des Strafens: Philosophische, Juristische Und Literaturwissenschaftliche Perspektiven*. 5. Wurzburg, Germany: Ergon, 2008. 233-49. Print.
- Marovitz, Sanford E. "The Double Bind: Leprosy in Two Hawaiian Tales by Jack London." *Eureka Studies in Teaching Short Fiction* 9.2 (2009): 160-66. Print.
- Monteiro, George. "The Jungle out There: Nick Adams Takes to the Road." *Hemingway Review* 29.1 (2009): 4. Print.
- Pizer, Donald. "Jack London's 'to Build a Fire': How Not to Read Naturalist Fiction." *Philosophy and Literature* 34.1 (2010): 218-27. Print.
- Robisch, S. K. *Wolves and the Wolf Myth in American Literature*. Reno, NV: U of Nevada P, 2009. Print.
- Frank Norris**
- Dawson, Jon Falsarella. "Transforming History: The Economic Context of Frank Norris's 'A Deal in Wheat.'" *Studies in American Naturalism* 4.2 (Winter 2009): 119-131.
- Duvall, J. Michael. "One Man's Junk: Material and Social Waste in Frank Norris's *McTeague*." *Studies in American Naturalism* 4.2 (Winter 2009): 132-151.
- Fusco, Katherine. "Brute Time: Anti-Modernism in *Vandover and the Brute*." *Studies in American Naturalism* 4.1 (2009): 22-40. Print.

- Gumina, Deanna Paoli. "Frank Norris: The Writer Who Couldn't Make the Numbers Add Up." *Studies in American Naturalism* 4.1 (2009): 75-82. Print.
- Nisetich, Rebecca. "The Nature of the Beast: Scientific Theories of Race and Sexuality in *McTeague*." *Studies in American Naturalism* 4.1 (2009): 1-21. Print.
- Savelson, Kim. *Where the World Is Not: Cultural Authority and Democratic Desire in Modern American Literature*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State UP, 2009. Print.

Other Authors

- Carroll, Dennis. "Mamet and Naturalism: Lakeboat and The Old Neighborhood." *Crossings: David Mamet's Work in Different Genres and Media*. Newcastle upon Tyne, England: Cambridge Scholars, 2009. 117-126.
- Etheridge, Charles L., Jr. "The Grapes of Wrath and Literary Naturalism." *The Grapes of Wrath: A Re-Consideration*. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Rodopi, 2009: 653-686. Print.
- Gibbs, Alan. "Naturalism and Steinbeck's 'Curious Compromise' in *The Grapes of Wrath*." *The Grapes of Wrath: A Re-Consideration*. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Rodopi, 2009: 687-704. Print.
- Petrovic, Paul. "'To Get to the Center': Recovering the Marginalized Woman in John Dos Passos's *Manhattan Transfer*." *Studies in American Naturalism* 4.2 (Winter 2009): 152-172.
- Reid, Colbey Emerson. "The Statistical Aesthetics of Henry James, or Jamesian Naturalism." *Henry James Review* 30.2 (2009): 101-114.
- Takeuchi, Masaya. "Bigger's Divided Self: Violence and Homosociality in *Native Son*." *Studies in American Naturalism* 4.1 (Summer 2009): 56-74.
- Wolter, Jennifer K. "The Médan Group and the Campaign of Naturalism." *Models of Collaboration in Nineteenth-Century French Literature: Several Authors, One Pen*. Ed. Seth Whidden. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009. 107-119.

From the Archives

This installment of From the Archives is Part One of a two-part essay written by David Starr Jordan and published in Popular Science Monthly in 1897. Jordan, a biologist and geneticist, served as the President of Indiana University, and, beginning in 1891, as President of Stanford University. As a statement of some of the key tenets of pragmatism, Jordan's essay serves as a nice entry into the field, and a valuable addition to the writings of William James and C. S. Pierce. In addition, as Patrick Dooley has pointed out, Jordan's essay had a direct impact on the thinking of Jack London, who has Maud Brewster quote Jordan in The Sea-Wolf. Beyond this direct influence, however, what one finds in "The Stability of Truth" is a scholar in the 1890s rethinking what terms like truth, belief, and faith mean in a post-Darwinian world. Part One of the essay, reprinted below, is from Popular Science Monthly, volume 50, March 1897, pages 642-654. Part Two of the essay can be found in the April 1897 issue, pages 749-757. Note: the editors of ALN apologize for the use of an 8-point font here: economies of space required it.

THE STABILITY OF TRUTH

By DAVID STARR JORDAN

President of Leland Stanford Junior University

WITHIN the last few years three notable assaults have been made on the integrity of science. Two of these have come from the hostile camp of mediaeval metaphysics, another from the very front of the army of science itself. Salisbury, Balfour, and Haeckel agree in this, that "belief" may rest on foundations unknown to "knowledge," and that the conclusions of science may be subject to additions and revisions in accordance with the demands of "belief." To some considerations suggested in part by Balfour's Foundations of Belief and Haeckel's Confession of Faith of a Man of Science I invite your attention today.

The growing complexity of civilized life demands with each age broader and more exact knowledge as to the material surroundings and greater precision in our recognition of the invisible forces or tendencies about us. We are in the hands of the Fates, and the greater our activities the more evident become these limiting conditions. The secret of power with man is to know its limitations. To this end we need constantly new accessions of truth as to the universe and better definition of the truths which are old. Such knowledge, tested and placed in order, we call science. Science is the gathered wisdom of the race. Only a part of it can be grasped by any one man. Each must enter into the work of others. Science is the flower of the altruism of the ages, by which nothing that lives "liveth for itself alone." The recognition of facts and laws is the province of science. We only know what lies about us from our own experience and that of others, this experience of others being translated into terms of our own experience and more or less perfectly blended with it. We can find the meaning of phenomena

only from our reasoning based on these experiences. All knowledge we can attain or hope to attain must, in so far as it is knowledge at all, be stated in terms of human experience. The laws of Nature are not the products of science. They are the human glimpses of that which is the "law before all time."

Thus human experience is the foundation of all knowledge. Even innate ideas, if such ideas exist, are derived in some way from knowledge possessed by our ancestors, as innate impulses to action are related to ancestral needs for action.

But is human experience the basis also of belief as it is of knowledge?

One of the questions of the day is this: Is "to believe" more than "to know"? Shall a sane man extend belief in directions where he has no knowledge and in lines outside the reach of his power to act? Can belief soar in space not traversable by "organized common sense"? If such distinction is made between "knowing" and "believing," which of the two has precedence as a guide for action? Is belief to be tested by science? Or is science useful only where belief is indifferent to the subject-matter? If belief is subordinate to the tests of science, to be accepted or rejected in the degree of its accord with human experience, then it is simply an annex to science, a footnote to human experience, and the authority of the latter is supreme. If, however, truth comes to us from sources outside of human experience, it must come in some pure form, free from human errors. As such it must claim the first place. In this event the progress of science will be always on a lower plane than the progress of belief.

In a recent address before the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the Marquis of Salisbury made in brief this contention: The central thought of modern science is evolution, the change from the simple to the complex. This implies not only the fundamental unity of all life, but the fundamental unity of all matter and perhaps of all force as well. In spite of the claims of scientific men, even the fact of organic evolution is far from demonstration; while of inorganic evolution, the development of the chemical elements, science can tell us nothing. Wherefore the marquis, in view of the failure of science to keep up with the progress of belief, grows jocose and patronizing. His advice to his scientific associates might be stated in the words of Thackeray, that "we should think small beer of ourselves and pass around the bottle."

More recently another English statesman, Mr. Arthur J. Balfour, has discussed the Foundations of Belief. He has shown that the methods of science can not give us *absolute truth*. Its methods are "of the earth, earthy." Its claim of trust in the infallibility of its own processes has no higher authority than the claim of infallibility made at times by religious organizations. For as only the senses and the reason can be appealed to in support of the claims of the senses and the reason, the argument of science is of necessity reasoning in a circle. Science can give us no ground solid enough to bear the weight of belief. Belief must exist, and it may therefore rest on the innate needs of man and the philosophy which is built on these needs in accordance with the authority which the human soul finds sufficient.

Balfour calls attention to the fact that human experience is not in its essence objective. It consists only of varying phases of consciousness. These phases of consciousness at best only point toward truth. They are not truth itself. They vary with the varying nerve cells of each individual creature on whom phases of consciousness are impressed, and again with the changes in the cells themselves. The tricks of the senses are well known in psychology, as is also the failure of the senses as to material outside their usual range. Life is at best "in a dimly lighted room," and all the objects about us are in their essence quite different from what they seem. This essence is unknown and unknowable. We are well aware that we have no power to recognize all phases of reality. The electric condition of an object may be as real as its color or its temperature, and yet none of our senses respond to it. Our eyes give but an octave of the vibrations we call light, and our ears are dull to all but a narrow range in pitch of sound.

Likewise is reason to be discredited. The commonest things become unknown or impossible when viewed "in the critical light of philosophy." Balfour shows that the simple affirmation, "the sun gives

light," loses all its meaning and possibility when taken out of the category of human experience and discussed in terms of philosophy. In like manner can any simple fact be thrown into the category of myths and dreams? A man can be led by the methods of metaphysics to doubt the existence of himself or of any object about him. For instance, take the discussion of "John's John" and of "Thomas's John," as given by Dr. Holmes. Is the real John the John as he appears to John himself? Or is he real only in the form in which Thomas regards him, or as he looks to Richard and Henry, whose interest in him is progressively less? All we know of the external universe is through the impressions made directly or indirectly on our nervous systems and through recorded impressions made on the systems of others; and a part of this external universe we ourselves are. All that we know of ourselves is that which is external to ourselves. Thus with all this, each man forms in his mind a universe of his own. "My mind to me a kingdom is," and this kingdom in all its parts is somewhat different from any other mental kingdom. It is continually changing. It was made but once, and will never be duplicated. When my vital processes cease, this kingdom will vanish "like the baseless fabric of a vision, leaving not a wreck behind." Our mind is the "stuff that dreams are made of"—and our bodies—what are they? Physically each man is an alliance of animals, each one of a single cell, each cell with its processes of life, growth, death, and reproduction, each one with its own "cell-soul" which presides over these processes. In the alliance of these cells, forming tissues and organs, we have the phenomena of mutual help and mutual dependence. In man we find the phenomena of animal life on a larger and more differentiated scale, but the fact of self grows faint as our study is continued. What is this vital force, and what have we to do with it; and is it, after all, more than another name for the movement of molecules? And of what are our cells composed? Carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, we know by name, but what are these in essence, and how are they different one from another? Does matter really exist? Mathematicians have claimed that all relations of ponderable matter and force might exist if the atoms of matter were not realities, but simply relations. Each of these atoms possessed of attraction or weight may be a vortex ring or eddy in the other, the ultimate units of which have vibration but not attraction. If, therefore, the body of man be an alliance of millions of animal cells, each cell formed of millions of eddies in an inconceivable and impossible ether; if all things around us are recognized only by their effect on the most unstable part of this unstable structure, then again "let us think small beer of ourselves and pass around the bottle."

Each fact or law must be expressed in terms of human experiences, if it is expressed or made intelligible at all. To such terms, the word reality applies, and beyond such reality we have never gone. Apparently beyond it we can not go, at least in the only life we have ever known. Balfour's plea for "philosophic doubt" of the reality of the subject matter of science is simply a rhetorical trick of describing the known in terms of the unknown. By the same process we may call a fishwife an "abracadabra" or an "icosahedrons," and by the same process we can build out of the commonest materials "an occult science" or a new theosophy. The measure of a man is the basis of human knowledge, and whatever can not be brought to this measure is no part of knowledge. In converse fashion Balfour speaks of the unknown in terms of the known; of the infinite in terms of human experience. This gives to his positive foundations of belief an appearance of reality as fallacious as the unreality he assigns to the foundations of science. This appearance of reality is the base of Haeckel's sneer at conventional religion as belief in a "gaseous vertebrate."

It is perfectly easy for science to distinguish between subjective and objective nerve conditions. It can separate those produced by subjective nervous derangements, or by conditions already passed, from those which are contemporary impressions of external things. It is perfectly easy for common sense to do the same. To be able to do so is the essence of sanity. The test of sanity is its livableness, for insanity is death. The borderland of spirit of which we hear so often of late, the land in which subjective and objective creations jostle each other, is the borderland of death. The continued existence of animals and men is based on the adequacy of their sensations and the veracity of their

actions. The existence of any creature is, in general, proof of the sanity of its ancestry, or at least of the sanity of those who controlled the actions of its ancestors.

This veracity is gauged by the degree of coincidence of subjective impressions and objective truth. Whoever makes a fool's paradise or a fool's hell of the world about him is not allowed to live in it. This fact in all its bearings must stand as a proof that the universe is outside of man and not within him. In this objective universe which lies outside ourselves we find "the ceaseless flow of force and the rational intelligence that pervades it." No part of it can be fully understood by us, but in it we find no chance movement, "no variability nor shadow of turning." That such a universe exists seems to demand some intelligence capable of understanding it, of stating its properties in terms of absolute truth as distinguished from those of human experience. Only an Infinite Being can be conceived as doing this, hence such knowledge must enter into our conception of the Infinite Being, whatever may be our theology in other respects. For to know an object or phenomenon in its fullness, "all in all," "we should know what God is and man is."

It is therefore no reproach to human science that it deals with human relations, not with absolute truths. "The ultimate truths of science," Dr. Schurman has said, "rest on the same basis as the ultimate truths of philosophy" – that is, on a basis that transcends human experience. This is true, for science has no "ultimate truths." There are none known to man. "The perfect truth," says Lessing, "is but for Thee alone." With ultimate truths human philosophy tries in some fashion to deal. To look at the universe in some degree through the eyes of God is the aim of philosophy. In its aim it is most noble. Its efforts are a source of strength in the conduct of human life. But its conclusions are not truth. They range from the puerile to the incomprehensible, and only science – that is, "common sense" – can distinguish the two. For this reason just in proportion as philosophy is successful it is unfit as a basis of human action. Human knowledge and action have limitations. The chief of these is that whatever can not be stated in terms of human experience is unintelligible to man. Whatever can not be thought can not be lived.

Philosophy has its recognized methods of procedure. These are laid down in the mechanism of the human brain itself. Science has found these methods untrustworthy as a means of reaching objective truth. The final test of scientific truth is this: Can we make it work? Can we trust our life to it? This test the conclusions of philosophy can not meet. In so far as they do so they are conclusions of science. As science advances in any field philosophy is driven away from it. The fact has been often noted that every great conclusion of science has been anticipated by philosophy, in most cases by the philosophy of the Greeks. But every conclusion science has shown to be false has been likewise anticipated. The Greeks taught the theory of development centuries before Darwin. But if Darwin's studies in life variation had led to any other result whatsoever, he would have been equally anticipated by the Greeks. In other words, every conceivable guess as to the origin and meaning of familiar phenomena has been exhausted by philosophy. Some of these guesses contain elements of truth. Which of these have such elements it is the business of Science to find out. Philosophy has no means of doing so. A truth not yet shown to be true is in science not a truth. It has no more validity than any other generalization not shown to be false. Helmholtz tells us that philosophy deals with such "*schlechtes Stoff*," such bad subject-matter, that it can give no trustworthy conclusions. Science alone can give the test of human life. The essence of this test is experiment.

The tests of philosophy are mainly these: Is the conception plausible? Has it logical continuity? Is it satisfying to the human heart? And in this connection the figurative word "heart" is best left undefined. In other words, its sources and its tests are alike subjective – intellectual or emotional. If we take from philosophy the "heart" element, the personal equation, it becomes logic or mathematics. Mathematics is metaphysics working through methods of precision. It is a most valuable instrument for the study of the relations and ramifications of knowledge, but it can give no addition to knowledge itself. Dr. William James defines metaphysics as "the persistent attempt to think clearly." This definition is good so far as it goes, but to think clearly is a function of science also. Metaphysics is rather the "attempt

to think clearly" in fields where exact data are unattained or unattainable. In so far as philosophy is simply clear thinking it is a most valuable agency for testing the deductions of science. But, while it can reject false conclusions, it can add no new matter of its own.

For example, the claim is made in the name of evolutionary philosophy that all matter is one in essence, therefore all the chemical elements, some seventy in number, must be the same in substance. In this case all must be derived from the same primitive stuff, and the hypothetical basis of all ponderable matter has been called protyl. As a working theory this is most ingenious. But is it science? Is it worthy of belief? Certainly Science knows nothing as yet of the identity of these elements. In a general way Science is finding out that the processes of Nature are more complex than man supposed, while the elements on which these processes rest, matter and force, are more simple. How far can this generalization go? To every test human experience has devised each chemical element remains the same, its atoms unchangeable as well as indestructible. Therefore, to speak of them as forms of one substance is to go beyond knowledge. Science does not teach this. But to philosophy this offers no difficulty. It is still plausible to suppose that by some combination of primitive units these variant atoms are formed. Such an idea would have logical continuity, and, as we are becoming used to the notions of primal unity, we find such an idea satisfying to our consciousness. If this is true, somewhere, somehow, lead will be resolved into its primal elements, and these elements may be united in the form of gold. Then will the dream of the alchemist become fact. But Science must make this objection: "Not until then." Such transmutation is as yet no part of knowledge. We certainly do not know that lead can be changed into that which is transmutable into gold. We do not know it, I say; but may we believe it? Is the foundation of belief less secure than that of knowledge? Can we trust Philosophy to tell us what to believe while we must look to Science to tell us what we know?

This brings us to the question of definitions. If knowledge and belief are of the like rank, both must rest on science, and the results of philosophy must come to science only as hints or suggestions as to lines of research.

If knowledge implies stability and belief does not, the relation of the two is also clear. In that case belief would be a word of light meaning, expressive of whim or of the balance of opinion. Such weight as it has would be drawn from its association with prejudice. Belief would then be the pretense of knowledge as compared with knowledge itself. Among its paths life can not march with courage and effectiveness. It is not for such beliefs as this that the martyrs have lived or died. Their inspiration was the positive belief of science or the negative belief of the falsity of the ideas that tyranny or superstition had forced upon them.

To avoid a discussion foreign to my purpose, I wish, if possible, to separate the word belief – as used in this paper – from the word religion. The essence of belief is the categorical statement of propositions. These may be built into a creed, which word is the Latin synonym of belief.

Religion implies rather a condition of the mind and heart – an attitude, not a formula. Faith, hope, charity do not rest on logic or observation. Religion implies a reverent attitude toward the universe and its forces, a kindly feeling toward one's fellow mortals and immortals. "Pure religion and undefiled" has never formulated a "creed," has never claimed for itself orthodoxy. It has no stated ritual and no recognized cult of priests. Much that passes conventionally as religious belief among men has no such quality or value. It is simpl[y] the *débris* of our grandfathers' science. While religion and belief become entangled in the human mind, so as not to be easily separable, the one is not necessarily a product of the other. In the higher sense no man can follow or inherit the religion of another. His religion, if he has any, is his own. Only forms can be transferred, realities never; for realities in life are the product of individual thought and action.

As the third of these efforts to discredit science I have placed Prof. Haeckel's recent address, The Confession of Faith of a Man of Science. This remarkable work is an eloquent plan for the acceptance of the philosophic doctrine of monism as the fundamental basis of science. This doctrine once adopted, we have the basis for large deduc-

tions, which forestall the slow conclusions of science; for monism brings the necessity for the belief in certain scientific hypotheses resting as yet on no foundations in human experience, incapable as yet of scientific verification, but which are a necessary part of the monistic creed. The primal conception of monism is, first, "that there lives one spirit in all things, and that the whole cognizable world is constituted and has been developed in accordance with one common fundamental law." This involves the essential oneness of all things, matter and force, object and spirit, Nature and God. This philosophical conception of monism and pantheism can not be made intelligible to us, because it can be stated in no terms of human experience. But it has certain necessary derivatives, according to Haeckel, and these are intelligible, because their subject-matter is available for scientific experiment.

First among these postulates, called by Haeckel "Articles of Faith," comes "the essential unity of organic and inorganic Nature, the former having been evolved from the latter only at a relatively recent period." This involves the "spontaneous generation" of life from inorganic matter. It also resolves "the vital force," or the force which appears in connection with protoplasmic structures, into properties shown by certain carbon compounds under certain conditions. Life is thus, in a sense, an emanation of carbon, "the true maker of life," according to Haeckel "being the tetrahedral carbon molecule."

This "Article of Faith" implies also the unity of the chemical elements, each of which is a product of the evolution of the primal unit of matter. Force and matter are likewise one, because neither appears except in the presence of the other. The inheritance of acquired characters is also made a corollary of monistic belief.

Now, all these hypotheses are possibly true, but none of them are as yet conclusions of science. They meet the conditions required by philosophy. They are plausible. They have the merit of logical continuity, and, excepting to those persons biased by early subjection to contrary notions, they satisfy the "human heart." There should be no natural repugnance to monism or to pantheism, difficult as it is to associate the idea of truth and reality with either or with the opposite of either. Speaking for myself, I feel no repugnance to them. They lend themselves to poetry; they appeal to the human heart. In Haeckel's own words, referring to something else, "such hereditary articles of faith take root all the more firmly, the further they are removed from the rational knowledge of Nature and enveloped in the mysterious mantle of mythological poesy." The present resistance to them may in time be turned into superstitious reverence for them; for, of all the philosophic doctrines brought down as lightning from heaven for the guidance of plodding man, these seem most attractive, and least likely to conflict with the conclusions of science.

But can we give them belief? Let us pass by the doctrine of monism, with which science can not concern itself. What of the corollaries? Spontaneous generation, for example, has been the basis of many experiments. Like the transmutation of metals, it seems reasonable to philosophy. The one idea has been the Will-o'-the-wisp of biology as the other has of chemistry. We know absolutely nothing of how, if ever, non-life becomes life. So far as we know, generation from first to last has been one unbroken series – "all life from life." We have no reason to believe that spontaneous generation exists under any conditions we have ever known. We have likewise reason to believe that if it exists at all we have no way of recognizing it. The organisms we know have all had a long history. Even the smallest shows traces of a long ancestry, a long process of natural selection, and of many concessions to environments. We know of no life that does not show such concessions. We know no creature that does not show homologies with all other living beings whatsoever. So far as this fact goes, it tends to show that all life is one. If this is true, spontaneous generation, whatever it may be, is not one of the ever-present phenomena of life.

If life does now appear without living parentage, if organisms fresh from the mint of creation now appear from inorganic matter, they are so simple that we can not know them. They are so small that we can not find them. They would be made, we may suppose, each of a small number of molecules. If there is truth in the calculations of Lord Kelvin and others, that a molecule is as small in a drop of water as a marble in comparison with the earth, then we may not look for these

creatures. If we can not find them, we do not know that they exist. If we do not *know* that they exist, shall we "believe" that they do? Is it not better, as Emerson suggests, that we should not "pretend to know and believe what we do not really know and believe"?

It may be that the existence of life in a world once lifeless renders spontaneous generation a "logical necessity." But the "logical necessity" exists in our minds, not in Nature. Science knows no "logical necessity," for the simple reason that we are never able to compass all the possibilities in any given case.

If we are to apply philosophic tests to the theories of reincarnation, we may find them equally eligible as articles of belief. They are plausible, to some minds at least; they have logical continuity. They are satisfying to the human heart, at least this is claimed by their advocates. Their chief fault is that they can be brought to no test of science and have no basis in inductive knowledge. In other words, their only reality is that of the vapors of dreamland. If plausibility and acceptability serve as sufficient foundations for belief, then belief itself is a frail and transient thing, no more worthy of respect than prejudice, from which indeed it could not be distinguished. Some such idea as this seems to be present in the mind of Mr. Gladstone. In a recent article, quoting in part the language of the honest Bishop Butler, he ascribes to certain doctrines "a degree of credibility sufficient for purposes of religion, and even a high degree of probability." In other words, religion, which deals with human hopes and fears, has less need of certainty than science, which is ultimately concerned with human action.

Haeckel makes the same distinction clearly enough. He uses the term "belief" for "hypotheses or conjectures of more or less probability" by which "the gaps empirical investigation must leave in science are filled up.... These," he says, "we can not indeed for a time establish on a secure basis, and yet we may make use of them in the way of explaining phenomena, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the rational knowledge of Nature. Such rational hypotheses," he says, "are scientific articles of faith." It is not clear, however, that so large a name as faith need be taken for working hypotheses confessedly uncertain or transient. The word "make-believe," used by Huxley in some such connection, might well be applied to hypothetical "articles of faith," until given a basis by scientific induction. But it seems to me that it is not necessary for the man of science to say "I believe," in addition to "I know." He should put off the livery of science when he enters the service of the Delphian oracles.

That all the doctrines above mentioned are necessarily included in monism may perhaps be doubted. Monism would still flourish were all these theories disproved. For human philosophies have wonderful recuperative power. Their basis is in the structure of the brain itself, and external phenomena are only accessory to them.

If monism is purely a philosophic conception, it can have no necessary axioms or corollaries, except such as are involved in its definition. These could not be scientific in their character, because they could in no way come into relation with the realities of human life. If, however, monism be a generalization resting in part on human experience, then it must be tested by the methods of science. Until it is so tested, however plausible it may be, it has no workable value. There is no gain in giving it belief, or in calling it truth. Still less should we stultify ourselves by pinning our faith to its postulates as to the matters yet to be decided by experiment, and to be settled by human experience only. Haeckel says, for example: "The inheritance of characters acquired during the life of the individual is an indispensable axiom of the monistic doctrine of evolution.... Those who with Weismann and Galton deny this entirely exclude thereby the possibility of any formative influence of the outer world upon organic form." Here we may ask, Who knows that there is any such formative influence? What do we know of this or any other subject beyond what in our investigations we find to be true? When was monism a subject of special revelation, and with what credentials does it come, that one of the greatest controversies in modern science should be settled by the simple word? "*Roma locuta est; causa finita est*" is a dictum no longer heeded by science.

The great bulk of the arguments in favor of the heredity of acquired characters, as well as most of those in favor of the opposed dogma, the unchanged continuity of the germ-plasm, are based on some

supposed logical necessity of philosophy. All such arguments are valueless in the light of fact. Desmarest's suggestion to the contending advocates of Neptunism and Plutonism was, "Go and see." When they had seen the action of water and the action of heat, the contest was over, for argument and contention had vanished in the face of fact. To believe without foundation is to discredit knowledge. Such "Confessions of Faith" on Haeckel's part lead one to doubt whether in his zeal for belief he has even known what it is to know. In fact, if we may trust his critics, much of Haeckel's scientific work is vitiated by this mixture of "believe" and "make-believe." The same confusion is shown in this remarkable passage which President White quotes from John Henry Newman: "Scripture says that the sun moves and the earth is stationary, and science that the earth moves and the sun is comparatively at rest. How can we determine which of these opposite statements is the very truth till we know what motion is? If our idea of motion is but an accidental result of our present senses, neither proposition is true and both are true; neither true philosophically; both true for certain practical purposes in the system in which they are respectively found."

Again, if we are to allow the revision of the generalizations of science by the addition of acceptable but unverified doctrines, we must allow the right of similar revision by rejection. Mr. Wallace, for example, would be justified in adding to the certainties of organic evolution his idea of the special creation of the mind of man. The old notion of the separate existence of the Ego, which plays on the nerve cells of the brain as a musician on the keys of a piano, would still linger in psychology. The astral body would hover on the verge of physiology, and a strong plea would go up for the reality of Santa Claus.

I have a scientific friend who finds it necessary to exclude by force, from his biological beliefs, all that is unpleasant in the theories of evolution. And he has the same right to do this that Prof. Haeckel has to insist that any scientific beliefs, for which science has yet no warrant, are a necessary part of the orthodoxy of science.

For Haeckel is not content to speak for himself, asking tolerance by tolerance toward others. His belief is no idiosyncrasy of his own. He speaks for all. Every honest, intelligent, courageous scientific man, he tells us, so far as he is truthful, competent, and brave, shares the same belief. His confession of faith is nothing if not orthodox. He says:

"This monistic confession has the greater claim to an unprejudiced consideration in that it is shared, I am firmly convinced, by at least nine tenths of the men of science now living: indeed, I believe, by all men of science in whom the following four conditions are realized: (1) Sufficient acquaintance with the various departments of natural science, and in particular with the modern doctrine of evolution; (2) sufficient acuteness and clearness of judgment to draw by induction and deduction the necessary logical consequences that flow from such empirical knowledge; (3) sufficient moral courage to maintain the monistic knowledge, so gained, against the attacks of hostile dualistic and pluralistic systems; and (4) sufficient strength of mind to free himself by sound, independent reasoning from dominant religious prejudices, and especially from those irrational dogmas which have been firmly lodged in our minds from earliest youth as indisputable revelations."

Against such assumption we must protest. I have nothing against the doctrines save that they are not yet true. In themselves, as I have said, they are attractive. One may naturally feel a hopeful interest in wide-reaching theories which seem possible, but are still unproved or unworkable. This is, however, not "belief." It is rather open mindedness, open to negative evidence as well as to the positive.

As science goes wherever the facts lead, so science must stop where the facts stop. It can not add to its methods the running high jump, nor place the divining rod with the microscope, crucible, and calculus among its instruments of precision. Beyond the range of scientific knowledge extend the working and the unworkable hypotheses. Beyond the confines of these extends the universe of the mind, the boundless realm which is the abode of philosophy. None should better realize those distinctions than men of science.

[End of Part One of Jordan's essay.]

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Eric Carl Link, eclink@memphis.edu
and/or
Steven Frye, sfrye@csu.edu

Coming up in our Spring 2011 Issue: Naturalism News. Another bibliographic update. More stuff from the archives. An interview with a scholar working in the field. More calls-for-papers. And a recipe for making a fruit torte garnished with edible gold leaf reprinted from the new book, *Cooking for Our Husbands* by Maria Macapa and Trina McTeague.

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Eric Carl Link, Editor ALN
Department of English
467 Patterson Hall
University of Memphis
Memphis, TN 38152